Formed: 1999

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: October 28, 2002: Members of Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad (which would later become AQI and then IS) assassinated U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officer Laurence Foley outside his home in Jordan (1 killed, 0 wounded).[1] 

Last Attack: March 24, 2021 - April 4, 2021: An IS affiliate group, known as the Islamic State Central Africa Province or ISIS-Mozambique, took over the town of Palma in northern Mozambique.[2] Militants targeted government, military, and civilian personnel and buildings. On March 29, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack via a statement released through its Amaq News Network.[3] However, the relationship between IS and IS-Central Africa has been described as “loose” and several observers doubt that IS was directly involved in the attacks.[4] Government forces did not completely reclaim control of Palma until April 4, 2021.[5] An estimated 40,000 people were displaced by the fighting, and the number of casualties is unknown (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[6]

Excecutive Summary

The Islamic State (IS) – also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – is a Salafi-Jihadist militant organization that operates primarily in Syria and Iraq. The group’s goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria and eventually spread its influence globally.[7] The foundations of IS were laid in the 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded IS' main predecessor group Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ) and began recruiting Jordanian criminals and training extremist militants at a camp in Herat, Afghanistan.

Group Narrative

During the American occupation of Iraq, the group was a major participant in the Iraqi insurgency, first as JTJ and then, after swearing fealty to Al Qaeda, as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Facing backlash from the community and increased pressure from American and Iraqi forces, the group declined in strength and influence. However, this downward trajectory reversed in 2011. The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq created a power vacuum. AQI stepped in to fill this vacuum, while the onset of the Syrian Civil War provided the group ample space to grow in both size and influence. In 2013, the group changed its name from AQI to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Throughout 2013 and 2014, the group seized territory in Syria and Iraq. ISIS changed its name to the Islamic State (IS) and declared the establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria in June 2014.

IS was notable for its public beheadings of Western captives, its large contingent of foreign fighters, and its substantial media presence. On the ground, IS displayed brutal efficiency and violence in battles against the Assad regime and Syrian-allied Shia forces, Syrian opposition groups, the Iraqi military, and the Kurdish peshmerga. The United States, in conjunction with European and Arab allies, began airstrikes against the group in fall 2014. By 2017, IS had lost control of its largest population centers and began to revert to more traditional terrorist tactics, developing sleeper cells and assimilating into the broader population. On March 23, 2019, IS lost its final piece of territory in Baghuz, Syria. As of April 2021, the group still lacks control over large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria.[8] However, IS remains highly active and continues to launch small- and large-scale terrorist attacks within the region.

This profile divides the Islamic State’s history into five periods and follows the group through several name changes. It begins with Zarqawi’s creation of the group through his death in 2006, which roughly coincides with the group being known as JTJ and becoming AQI. It continues with a period of setbacks from 2006 through 2011, the period of AQI’s decline. The next section discusses developments between 2012 and 2014, during which the group expanded and fought in Syria and Iraq and changed its name to ISIS. The fourth section roughly coincides with the group’s rebranding as IS and discusses the global response to IS’s caliphate. The final section discusses the destruction of the caliphate and the groups transition to traditional terrorist tactics.

 

JTJ and AQI under Zarqawi: 1999-June 2006

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the Islamic State, was Jordanian national. He radicalized as a young man while in prison for drug possession and sexual assault. After he was released from prison, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s with the intention of joining the fight against Soviet occupation.[9] After returning to Jordan in 1992, Zarqawi founded a militant group named Bayat al-Imam with his mentor Sheikh Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi.[10] During the 1990s, Zarqawi adopted a Salafi ideology and was arrested again following a police raid on his home.[11] Zarqawi developed a following of radicalized criminals while in prison and used sympathetic guards and visiting relatives to smuggle his messages out to be published on prominent Salafi websites.[12]

In 1999, Zarqawi was released and traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden. The two distrusted one another immediately, and key ideological disagreements became apparent. Zarqawi preferred to target “near enemies,” such as Israel and the Jordanian government, whereas the AQ leadership focused on the “far enemy” (i.e., the United States).[13] Zarqawi also had a strong hatred for Shiites that bin Laden did not share.[14] Despite these core ideological disagreements, bin Laden allegedly asked Zarqawi to join AQ.[15] Zarqawi refused. After this rejection, bin Laden decided to provide Zarqawi with funding to set up a militant training camp in Herat, Afghanistan.[16] By October 2001, Zarqawi had trained between 2,000 and 3,000 Salafi terrorists at the Herat camp.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, Western intelligence organizations began searching for Zarqawi.[17] He and his followers spread throughout Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq to evade U.S. intelligence while establishing new groups and building a network of foreign fighters.[18] The U.S. State Department eventually classified all these groups under the name of the most prominent Zarqawi organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ, also sometimes referred to as Tawhid wal-Jihad or TwJ).[19] The group had a strong foundation of foreign fighters, particularly from Jordan, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kurdish regions while other militants from Ansar al-Islam joined the group as well.[20]

AQ leadership urged Muslims to move to Iraq to fight the American invaders. Zarqawi became the default leader of Islamist terrorists in Iraq and concentrated his network of foreign fighters in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq.[21] JTJ and Zarqawi grew to be among the most prominent actors in the insurgency. Zarqawi’s group aimed to expel American and coalition forces and disrupt the governmental transition with its operations.[22] JTJ quickly gained notoriety for its violent tactics and attacks on non-combatants, including aid workers and native Iraqis. JTJ carried out suicide bombings that killed civilians, while other insurgent groups used guerilla attacks that targeted American and coalition forces.[23] The group routinely conducted attacks on Shia targets to incite sectarian conflict and complicate the occupation and government transition.[24] JTJ also drew international attention for its assassinations and the gruesome videos of beheadings that it released on the internet.[25]

In October 2004, Zarqawi formally joined Al Qaeda and renamed his organization Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn Zarqawi, known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in English.[26] Despite the official pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi and Al Qaeda leadership still differed on some key strategic and tactical issues. Disagreements included AQ’s willingness to cooperate with other opposition groups and its focus on the United States and the West rather than “near enemies.” These differences between AQ and AQI created tensions that lasted for the duration of the affiliate relationship.[27]

Initially, many Sunnis in Iraq were sympathetic to AQI. The group’s goal of driving American and coalition forces from Iraq and preventing a Shia government takeover were appealing to the Sunni population. However, AQI’s extreme tactics alienated potential supporters. Many Iraqis, including Sunnis, took issue with AQI’s use of suicide bombings and other violent attacks, such as assassinations. Additionally, Iraqis disapproved of the group’s willingness to target Iraqis and popular Sunni leaders; its perceived foreign membership and leadership; and its intentional incitement of sectarian violence.[28]

AQI’s increasingly violent attacks prompted AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in command at the time, to send Zarqawi a letter urging him to foster better relations with Iraqi leaders.[29] However, Zarqawi often ignored AQ orders and continued to alienate potential supporters with his tactics. The bombing of a hotel in Amman that killed mostly civilians in November 2005 illustrates Zarqawi’s disregard for AQ strategy and guidance.[30] Many Islamist groups also condemned Zarqawi's strategy of killing large numbers of Shiites and destroying Shia religious sites to incite sectarian violence.[31] On February 22, 2006, AQI bombed the Askariyah Shrine in Samarra, also known as the Golden Mosque. The attack prompted at least 27 retaliatory strikes by Shia insurgents against Sunni mosques in Baghdad alone, all of which occurred the same day as the Golden Mosque bombing. As a result of these strikes, violence between Shiites and Sunnis escalated.[32]

Facing local backlash, AQI joined an umbrella organization – Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSC) – in an effort to present itself as more of an Iraqi group and demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with other organizations.[33] The MSC was a collective of six jihadi groups in Iraq that sought to expel American and coalition forces from Iraq.[34] MSC, however, exercised little control over the actions of its constituent groups. MSC was a coordination body at most, a media front at worst, and had little to no control over what AQI did.[35]

 

AQI decline: June 2006-December 2011

On June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike.[36] AQI announced that Zarqawi’s successor would be Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian bombmaker who had trained in Afghanistan.[37] Despite some intelligence officials’ assumptions that Zarqawi’s death would cripple the organization, Masri initially managed to maintain much of the group’s momentum, especially in carrying out attacks that encouraged sectarian violence.[38]

However, many Iraqi Sunnis continued to criticize AQI for its foreign components, its attempts to impose its own radical brand of Islam on Iraqis, and its use of extreme violence. To brand AQI as more Iraqi, Masri convinced several other groups to merge into his and form the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, although the group also continued to be known as AQI).[39] Masri installed an Iraqi, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, as the head of ISI. Although the name and leadership changes were another attempt to rebrand the organization as more Iraqi (“Baghdadi” means “from Baghdad”), some sources questioned whether Baghdadi truly ran the organization or if he was just a figurehead.[40]  In forming ISI, AQI aimed to unify the resistance against American and coalition forces, gain attention and support from the global jihadi community, and prepare governing structures to take control after foreign militaries withdrew from the country.[41] This move was to be the first step toward creating a caliphate to rule in the Middle East.[42]

The foreign presence in AQI’s leadership and membership continued to alienate local Iraqis. By December 2007, local concerns forced Abu Umar al-Baghdadi to issue a public statement claiming that only 200 foreign fighters were members of AQI. It is true that the membership of AQI was majority Iraqi in 2006, but coalition forces captured records in 2007 that documented 700 foreign nationals joining AQI and its affiliates between August 2006 and August 2007.[43] While there is evidence that the pace of foreign recruitment was slowing, Baghdadi’s declaration was not enough to convince many Iraqis to support AQI.[44]

Local resistance to AQI contributed to the Anbar Awakening, a movement in which Sunni tribes in Anbar province began to cooperate with American forces against the insurgency.[45] The Awakening paved the way for increased U.S. and Iraqi military operations that would diminish AQI’s capacity by the end of 2007. As a result, AQI was unable to provide security or enforce its extreme interpretations of Islamic law in the areas where it operated. Under this pressure, the group struggled to maintain control over territory in Iraq.[46]

By early 2008, coalition and Iraqi security forces had killed 2,400 AQI members and taken 8,800 as prisoners.[47] By spring 2009, the U.S. was funding around 100,000 local Sunnis to fight AQI.[48] The local fighters assassinated AQI members and warned other militants not to work with the group.[49] By June 2010, AQI had lost its ability to regularly communicate with AQ leadership, and 36 of AQI’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured.[50] Through 2011, coalition forces continued to coordinate efforts with tribal security forces, killing the majority of AQI’s leadership and leaving it in disarray.[51]

Both Masri and Baghdadi were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid on April 18, 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with the deceased, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi) then assumed control of the organization.[52] AQI continued to struggle to maintain relevance through 2011. Coalition forces withdrew later that year.[53]

 

AQI and ISIS expansion under Baghdadi: January 2012-2014

The withdrawal of coalition forces in December 2011 effectively gave new life to AQI. The organization was no longer facing direct pressure from foreign military forces, allowing it room to recover and coordinate operations. Throughout 2012, the number of AQI attacks increased significantly.[54] In 2012 and 2013, Baghdadi led two separate terror campaigns in Iraq. In 2012, the “Breaking Walls” campaign targeted Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government and prioritized freeing AQI members from prison. In 2013, the “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign targeted Iraqi security forces.[55]

The government’s ostracization of Sunni communities and security failures expedited AQI’s return to prominence. In December 2012, Sunnis in northern Iraq began protesting Maliki’s heavy-handed and sectarian governance in Anbar province. When Iraqi security forces invaded protest camps, Sunni attacks against Shia targets increased. Causalities mounted, and the civilian death toll in 2013 grew to double that of 2012. When Iraqi security forces attempted to clear a protest camp in Ramadi at the end of 2013, a local uprising drove the security forces out of much of Anbar province, paving the way for later AQI expansion.[56] In 2013, AQI spread throughout the Anbar and Nineveh provinces, recruiting new members and developing alliances with preexisting local Sunni militias, including Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia, JRTN).[57] JRTN was largely composed of Ba’athists and was led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the former vice president of Saddam Hussein’s regime.[58] The military expertise of these allies bolstered AQI’s strength.

AQI also exploited the power vacuum created by the ongoing Syrian Civil War. In April 2013, Baghdadi moved into Syria and rapidly seized territory. During this time, Baghdadi changed the group’s name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also claimed that AQI had created Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra), a militant opposition group in Syria, and stated that that the two groups had now merged. Both the Al-Nusra leadership and AQ leader Zawahiri disputed the merger.[59] Zawahiri dictated that ISIS should limit its operations to Iraq.[60] On June 14, Baghdadi publicly rejected Zawahiri’s statement. ISIS continued to operate in Syria, clashing with other Islamist groups and taking additional territory.[61] In January 2014, ISIS captured the strategic Syrian city of Raqqa against the commands of AQ leadership.[62] AQ officially renounced connection with ISIS in February 2014.[63] 

After the split with AQ, ISIS continued to expand and carry out military offensives in Syria and Iraq. The group fought against the governments of Iraq and Syria, tribal groups and militias in Iraq, the Kurdish peshmerga, and various rebel groups in Syria. ISIS’s strength came from its versatility: part terrorist group, part bureaucratic state, part light infantry. The group was able to seize territory quickly, incite global fear and panic, and establish a basic government in captured cities.[64] The group’s strong media presence also allowed it to recruit members easily. Between 2011 and 2016, over 42,000 foreign fighters travelled to join IS from over 120 countries.[65]

In the first half of 2014, ISIS made large territorial gains in Iraq. The group seized Fallujah in January and captured Mosul, Tikrit, and Tal Afar in June.[66]  On June 29, 2014, the group again changed its name, this time to the Islamic State (IS). IS also declared a caliphate with its capital in Raqqa, Syria and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, as caliph. The group called upon all Muslims to declare allegiance to the new caliphate.[67] By August 2014, IS had control over Iraq’s Ain Zalah and Batma oil fields and the Mosul Dam, which provided the group with additional sources of wealth.[68]

In Syria, IS benefited from the relatively ambivalent response of the Assad regime which used IS’s presence in the north to force rebel groups into a two-front war.[69] In early 2014, IS suffered losses in northern Syria but retained its stronghold around Raqqa. In the second half of 2014, the group began using weaponry captured from victories in Iraq to gain new momentum in Syria.[70] IS retook territory in northern Syria and attacked a Kurdish militia around the border town of Kobane. The group benefited both from the Assad regime’s use of IS to create a two-front war and from the regime’s willingness to purchase oil from its territories. Turkey and the Free Syrian Army also acquired oil from IS, implicitly funding the organization.[71]

The IS caliphate peaked in size in late 2014. IS controlled 100,000 square kilometers of territory, which was home to more than 11 million people.[72] The funds seized from occupied territories combined with natural resources sales, taxation of local communities, and criminal activities yielded IS an estimated $2 billion in assets.[73] In September 2014, experts estimated that IS’s oil revenues alone brought in between $1 million and $2 million per day, making IS the richest terrorist organization in the world.[74] For a more detailed description of IS’s finances, see the resources section of this profile.

 

IS contraction under regional and global pressure: 2014-2018

The Islamic State’s rapid territorial gains in 2013 and 2014 prompted a regional and international response. On August 7, 2014, U.S. President Barak Obama authorized limited air strikes to defend U.S. personnel in Erbil and Baghdad. The strikes were also directed to support the Yazidis, a religious minority stranded on a remote mountain in Iraq and under threat of massacre by IS.[75] Over time, an international coalition – including several European and Arab states, the United States, Turkey, and Iran – formed to support the Iraqi government, the Kurdish peshmerga, and Shia militias fighting against IS.[76] Though there were few ideological similarities uniting the coalition, it rallied behind the shared goal of defeating IS.

In October 2014, the Iraqi army defended its positions to maintain control of Anbar province while the Kurdish peshmerga fought to impede IS’s advancement towards Kobani in northern Syria.[77] In Iraq, IS’s territorial gains slowed as it began to encounter non-Sunni towns, whose populations were more likely to resist IS occupation than Sunni-majority towns.[78] In Syria, IS continued to face hostile militant groups, and IS’s formerly neutral relationship with the Assad regime turned hostile following the group’s occupation of Raqqa.[79] After initial IS successes in the battle over the northern city of Kobani in November, Turkey opened its borders for Iraqi Kurdish militants to join the front in Syria. Additionally, the United States conducted airstrikes on IS bases in Kobani and provided weapons and ammunition to Kurdish groups.[80]

In early 2015, Iraqi government forces, Iraqi tribesmen, and Shia militias continued their campaign against IS from the south and east. In the north, IS faced the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Pressures from all sides forced the group into a debilitating multifront war.[81] Despite its strong military capabilities, IS began to weaken in 2015, losing much of its core revenue because of coalition airstrikes on oil fields and the destruction of agricultural commodities during the fighting.[82] The group became increasingly reliant on criminal activities such as extortion, money laundering, and drug smuggling to generate wealth for its war efforts.[83]  However, in May 2015, IS managed to achieve a breakthrough amid mounting pressure from its enemies. The group seized Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar province, and Palmyra, a historic Syrian city.[84] By late 2015, IS exercised control over a region home to 5 million people. Though this territory was roughly half of its peak size, the group still held several key cities in Iraq and Syria, including Mosul, Raqqa, Ramadi, and Palmyra.[85]

Around this time, IS began expanding beyond its caliphate. The group established Wilayat - Arabic for "states" - abroad, developed alliances with other militant groups, and carried out terrorist attacks on a global scale. The group capitalized on domestic instability in Libya to spark a major insurgency in the country. Active Islamist militant groups in several countries declared allegiance to IS, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis in Egypt.[86] These groups’ territories are considered the Islamic State’s “provinces” – wilayah in the group’s parlance. For more details on IS’s international affiliates, see the relationships with other groups section in this profile. Also see each group’s individual profile on the Mapping Militants website and the Global Islamic State map.

IS has also carried out numerous terrorist attacks outside of Iraq and Syria. In late 2015 and early 2016, IS militants shot down a Russian plane over the Sinai peninsula, detonated bombs throughout Paris in a series of coordinated attacks, and carried out major bombings at a Belgian airport and metro station. [87] IS’s strong media presence (led by its Al Hayat Media Center) has also inspired individuals around the world to adopt the group’s ideology and carry out attacks. Notable examples include two 2016 attacks in the United States, the first by a gunman at a holiday party in San Bernardino, California and the second by a gunman at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.[88] For a larger list of IS attacks, see the major attacks section.

In 2016, the anti-IS coalition achieved important victories in IS-controlled territories, recovering Ramadi in February and Falluja in June.[89] IS consistently surprised coalition forces with its fierce resistance and brutal urban fighting with high civilian casualties.[90] In Iraq, the Iraqi army and local Shia militias cooperated in an effort to take and hold IS territory. The Iraqi army focused on liberating an IS-controlled city, and local Shia militias held and protected the territory after the Iraqi military victory.[91] This allowed the Iraqi army to move to the next battle without leaving recaptured areas unsecured and vulnerable. The Shia militia presence, however, also led to tensions with the mostly Sunni communities that they now patrolled.[92]

IS faced additional setbacks in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led the fight against IS in Syria, cutting off IS supply routes to the Turkish border and consolidating territory seized from IS in the northeast.[93] As IS’s defeat became inevitable, the war to defeat IS quickly became a race to dominate previously IS-controlled territory. The Assad regime and its Russian allies seized IS territory in the border region between Syria and Iraq, while Turkish forces targeted SDF bases with airstrikes and attempted to suppress Kurdish autonomy since it could lead to Kurdish uprisings in Turkey.[94]

In late 2016, coalition forces began major offensives against IS’s last major strongholds in Iraq and Syria: Mosul and Raqqa. The siege of Mosul lasted for nine months, culminating in IS’ defeat on July 10, 2017.[95] The battle for Raqqa consisted of two preliminary phases: on November 6, 2016, SDF forces began seizing major roadways and rural villages to isolate Raqqa, while throughout June 2017, SDF closed in upon and fought for control of the city. On October 17, 2017, the last IS militants in Raqqa surrendered. IS had lost control of all its major cities and held only a small piece of territory in Abu Kamal District, Syria along the Euphrates river.[96]

 

Death of the IS caliphate and return to insurgency: 2018-2021

Despite these losses, the U.S.-led joint task force against IS reported that IS fighters seemed unphased by airstrikes and continued to engage in counter offensives.[97] Throughout 2018, IS made up for its declining strength by reverting to more traditional terrorist tactics; the group developed a network of sleeper cells and engaged in guerilla warfare throughout Syria and Iraq.[98] The lack of a stable state presence in the region allowed IS to harass local populations and carry out small-scale terrorist attacks. From mid-2018 to March 2019, the group conducted 250 terrorist attacks against civilians.[99] Including its attacks on infrastructure and government forces, the group carried out an average of 127.1 attacks per month in 2018.[100]

Though the group’s ability to control territory had diminished, the Islamic State still retained extensive wealth and a strong media presence. In 2017, IS smuggled $400 million out of its territory and began laundering money through front businesses in Turkey to prepare for its eventual defeat.[101] The group also invested $250 million in Iraqi markets, partnering with legitimate businesses throughout the country.[102]

IS lost its final piece of caliphate territory in Baghuz, Syria on March 23, 2019.[103] Remaining families of IS soldiers fled the territory and were taken captive. Anti-IS coalition leaders celebrated the supposed defeat of IS, but experts were wary of a possible resurgence. In March 2019, foreign policy analysts argued that the group was stronger than when the U.S. withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011.[104]

As of August 2019, governments in Iraq and Syria have struggled to reintegrate the tens of thousands of IS affiliates held in prison and security camps.[105] Many of these affiliates are the families of IS militants, specifically women who renounced citizenship in their home countries and children born in Iraq and Syria with only IS birth documents.[106] Some observers argue existence of such a large, stateless population will prolong IS’ influence in the region by prolonging the material suffering detainees endure and the requisite grievances such suffering generates while held in the camps.[107]

On October 13, 2019, U.S. President Trump ordered a withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria. Trump took this action ahead of a Turkish invasion of the "buffer zone" that separated Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups and U.S.- backed Kurdish militias.[108] Analysts have argued that the withdrawal of U.S. troops provided an opening for IS. Without the backing of U.S. troops, the Kurds have faced pressure from the Turkish military and its allies which seek to push Kurdish militias away from the Syria-Turkey border. Reports argue that these Kurdish militias will struggle to balance this threat from Turkey with the need to contain a potential IS resurgence in SDF-controlled parts of Syria.[109]

On October 13, 2019 – the day President Trump ordered the American withdrawal from Syria – Turkey began its long-threatened offensive into SDF-controlled Syrian territory. After losing its most significant strategic partner – the United States – the SDF was immediately forced to contend with a Turkish offensive against its territory on top of existing threats from the regime and its partners and its counter-IS duties. Shortly after the announcement of a U.S. withdrawal from Syria, signs of difficulties in containing IS and its remnants began to appear. Turkey’s invasion forced the SDF to shift segments of its armed forces from counterinsurgency and prison management to frontline duty. On the same day Turkey’s offensive began, more than 750 people with suspected links to IS, many of whom were wives and children of IS fighters, escaped the SDF-run Ain Issa detention camp in northeastern Syria.[110] Residents of the camp reportedly began a riot and overpowered their Kurdish guards as Turkish artillery fire landed near the camp. Just one week later, roughly 100 IS prisoners, many of whom were reportedly foreign fighters, escaped from the SDF-run Al Hol prison camp in eastern Syria.[111]

On October 27, 2019, the United States conducted a raid on the compound of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi detonated the suicide belt he was wearing as U.S. Special Forces closed in on his position outside of Barisha, Idlib province in northwestern Syria.[112] The same day, a separate U.S. airstrike killed Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, a top spokesman for the group and, according to SDF intelligence, Baghdadi's likely successor.[113] Several days thereafter, IS’s central media outlet Al-Furqan Media confirmed the deaths of Baghdadi and Muhajir. Al-Furqan Media also announced the group's leadership council had named Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi to succeed Baghdadi as Caliph.[114]

There is evidence that IS shifted its organizational composition leading up to and in the wake of Baghdadi's death. An August 2020 report, based on observation and analysis of the group's communications, suggested that Iraqi members came to comprise the bulk of IS civil and military leadership.[115] This nationality-based consolidation appears to have begun well before Baghdadi's death, as IS's enemies targeted members of its leadership with assassination. However, with the deaths of Baghdadi and several other major figures, Iraqis of all ethnic backgrounds have assumed positions in the group previously held by Sunni Arabs of other nationalities.[116]

Since losing its territory, IS has been forced to reconsider its strategy. The loss of the caliphate has deprived the group of a major recruitment tool, lucrative financial resources, and the physical space necessary to sustain a large-scale military campaign. As a result, IS has been forced to revert to traditional insurgency tactics to continue its mission.[117] In this new role, IS continues to wage war with an increasing degree of ferocity and tactical sophistication against Iraqi and Syrian security forces – regular or otherwise.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has served as a particularly significant boon for the group's capabilities, as the virus has drawn governments' attention away from existing counterterrorism efforts and toward public health measures.[118] With this shift in government focus, the group has been able to increase the pace of its insurgent campaign in 2020. In northern and central Iraq, IS fighters have carried out increasingly sophisticated attacks targeting military checkpoints and Iraqi military housing. Across eastern Syria, IS has conducted a steady campaign of assassinations, ambushes, and bombings. The group is also responsible for the deaths of an increasing number of regime and SDF forces.[119]

As of late 2020, the consensus among U.S. military strategists was that IS, even in its significantly reduced form, remains an issue of paramount importance. The group continues to pose a direct threat to regional governments already under considerable coronavirus- and economic downturn-induced stress.[120] Moreover, security officials and analysts have become increasingly concerned that a possible reduction of U.S. troop levels in Iraq will hinder the ability of the United States to maintain pressure against the group. A waning U.S. troop presence and commitment to the counter-IS mission may allow IS to reconstitute and reorganize unabated.[121]

 

[1] "Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad," GlobalSecurity.org, 6 Dec. 2006. Web. 26 Jan. 2010; "US Diplomat Shot Dead in Jordan." BBC News. BBC, 28 Oct. 2002. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[2] “Cabo Ligado Weekly: 29 March-4 April.” Cabo Ligado Conflict Observatory, April 2021. https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-29-march-4-april-…

[3] Christina Goldbaum. “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Mozambique Attack.” The New York Times, March 30, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack…; “Islamic State Claims Dayslong Attack on Mozambique Town.” VOA News, March 29, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/africa/islamic-state-claims-dayslong-attack-moz…; Emilia Columbo and Austin C. Doctor. “Foreign Fighters and the Trajectory of Violence in Northern Mozambique.” War on the Rocks, April 13, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/foreign-fighters-and-the-trajectory-o…

[4] Christina Goldbaum. “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Mozambique Attack.” The New York Times, March 30, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack…

[5] “Cabo Ligado Weekly: 29 March-4 April.” Cabo Ligado Conflict Observatory, April 2021. https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-29-march-4-april-…

[6] Associated Press. “40,000 Displaced in North Mozambique After Assault on Palma.” U.S. News and Word Report, April 20, 2021. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-20/40-000-displaced-…

[7] Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State.” The Brookings Institution, March 9, 2015. 4.

[8] In February 2021, a U.S. military official said that the Islamic State “remains a serious challenge” but that it “is no longer able to sustainably occupy any territory in Iraq and Syria.” See Abdulla, Namo. “Kurds Warn of Growing Islamic State Capabilities in Iraq.” VOA News, February 7, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/kurds-warn-growing-islamic-stat…

[9] Weaver, Mary Anne. “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.” The Atlantic, August 2006.

[10] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 2.

[11] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 2.

[12] Weaver, Mary Anne. “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.” The Atlantic, August 2006.

[13] Bergen, Peter, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro. Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq. Rep. Ed. Brian Fishman. Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2008. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.

[14] Iraqi police officer shot dead by sniper in Diyala," Aswat al-Iraq via BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 13, 2010, LexisNexis Academic; Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.; Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006. Rep. West Point: Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007. Pg 19. Print. Harmony Project.

[15] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3.

[16] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3.

[17] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3

[18] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3.

[19] "Profile: Tawhid and Jihad Group." BBC News. 8 Oct. 2004. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[20] Laub, Zachary, and Jonathan Masters. "The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 28 Nov. 2014.

Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. Rep. Harmony Project at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. Page 4. 9 Dec. 2014.

[21] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3.

[22] Felter, Joseph, and Fishman, Brian, "Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar records," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 24, Jan. 2010; Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[23] Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 70. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.

[24] "Al Qaeda, Iraq Partners in Terror -- Powell." CNN. 3 Feb. 2003. Web. 24 Nov. 2014; Boucher, Richard. "Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad and Aliases." Archive. U.S. Department of State, 15 Oct. 2004. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[25] Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Says Berg's Killer Was Very Probably Zarqawi." The New York Times. 13 May 2004. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[26] Felter, Joseph, and Fishman, Brian, "Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar records," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 24 Jan. 2010; Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[27] Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. Rep. Harmony Project at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.

[28] Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling Jensen. “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening.” National Defense University, Jan. 2010. Web. 7 Jul. 2014; Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. Rep. Harmony Project at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.

[29] “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al Qaeda from 1989-2006," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007. Web. 24 Jan. 2010.

[30] Philips, James, "Zarqawi's Amman bombings: Jordan's 9/11," The Heritage Foundation, 18 Nov. 2005. Web. 26 Jan. 2010; Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jun. 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

[31] Hunt, Emily, "Zarqawi's 'Total War' on Iraqi Shiites exposes a divide among Sunni Jihadists," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15 Nov. 2005. Web. 26 Jan. 2010.

[32] Worth, Robert F. “Muslim Clerics Call for an End to Iraqi Rioting.” New York Times, 25 Feb. 2006. 8, Jul. 2014; Worth, Robert F. “Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq.” The New York Times, 23 Feb. 2006. Web. 2 Jul. 2014.

[33] Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. Rep. Harmony Project at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.

[34] "Terrorist Organization Profile: Mujahideen Shura Council." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. University of Maryland, n.d. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.

[35] Bergen, Peter, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro. Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq. Rep. Ed. Brian Fishman. Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2008. Web, 12. 22 Dec. 2014.

[36] Felter, Joseph, and Fishman, Brian, "Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar records," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 24 Jan. 2010.

[37] Kaplan, Eben. "Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, Zarqawi's Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub Al-Masri)." Council on Foreign Relations. 13 June 2006. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.

[38] DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here." Washington Post. 18 Mar. 2007. Web. 29 Nov. 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007…

[39] DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here." Washington Post. 18 Mar. 2007. Web. 29 Nov. 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007…

[40] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.; Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qai'da's Foreign Fighters in Iraq. Rep. Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 2 Jan. 2007. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.

[41] Felter, Joseph, and Brian Fishman. Al-Qai'da's Foreign Fighters in Iraq. Rep. Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 2 Jan. 2007. Web. 26 Nov. 2014. 5.

[42] Siegel, Pascal C. "Islamic State of Iraq Commemorates Its Two-Year Anniversary." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. N.p., 15 Oct. 2008. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.

[43] Laub, Zachary, and Jonathan Masters. "The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 28 Nov. 2014; DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here." Washington Post. 18 Mar. 2007. Web. 29 Nov. 2014; Fishman, Brian, and Joseph Felter. "Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2 Jan. 2007. Web. 26 Nov. 2014.

[44] Bergen, Peter, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro. Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq. Rep. Ed. Brian Fishman. Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2008. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.

[45] Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 72. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. Web. 17 Dec. 2014; Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling Jensen. “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening.” National Defense University. Jan. 2010. Web. 7 Jul. 2014.

[46] Felter, Joseph, and Fishman, Brian, "Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in Iraq: A first look at the Sinjar records," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 24, Jan. 2010.

[47] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3-5.

[48] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3-5.

[49] Kirdar, MJ. AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Publication. Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011. Web. 24 Nov. 2014. 3-5.

[50] Lewis, Jessica D. “Middle East Security Report 14: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I.” Institute for the Study of War. September 2013.; Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 73.

[51] Lewis, Jessica D. “Middle East Security Report 14: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I.” Institute for the Study of War, September 2013.

[52] “Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI) - Terrorist Groups." National Counterterrorism Center Calendar 2014. National Counterterrorism Center, n.d. Web. 23 June 2014.

[53] “Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI) - Terrorist Groups." National Counterterrorism Center Calendar 2014. National Counterterrorism Center, n.d. Web. 23 June 2014.

[54] Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 74. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. Web. 17 Dec. 2014; Lewis, Jessica D. “Middle East Security Report 14: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I.” Institute for the Study of War. Instituted for the Study of War, Sep. 2013. Web. 7 Jul. 2014.

[55] Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 76. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.; Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21.4 (2014): 76. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12096. Web. 17 Dec. 2014.

[56] Laub, Zachary, and Jonathan Masters. "The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." Backgrounders. Council on Foreign Relations, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 28 Nov. 2014.

[57] “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” Middle East Policy Council. Accessed September 9, 2019. Hashim, Ahmed. “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” Middle East Policy Council, Volume XXI, Number 4 - Winter 2014..

[58] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 304.

[59] “Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI) - Terrorist Groups." National Counterterrorism Center Calendar 2014. National Counterterrorism Center, n.d. Web. 23 June 2014; Joscelyn, Thomas. "Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front emerge as rebranded single entity." The Long War Journal. Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 9 Apr. 2013. Web. 23 June 2014.

[60] Atassi, Basma. "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger." Al Jazeera America 9 June 2013. Al Jazeera. Web. 24 June 2014.

[61] "Will the jihadists overreach?." The Economist 12 Oct. 2013. The Economist. Web. 23 June 2014; Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria.” The Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations, 12 Jun. .2014. Web. 23 Jun. 2014.

[62] “Syria, Anti-Assad Rebel Infighting Leaves 700 Dead, Including Civilians.” Asia News, January 13, 2014.

[63] Joscelyn, Thomas. "Al Qaeda's general command disowns the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham." The Long War Journal. Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 3 Feb. 2014. Web. 24 June 2014.

[64] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 304.

[65] Radicalisation Awareness Network. "RAN Manual: Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families." Radicalisation Awareness Network: July 2017, 17. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10….

[66] Semple, Kirk, and Eric Schmitt. "ISIS Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Hesitate." The New York Times. 17 Oct. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.; Chulov, Martin. “Isis insurgents seize control of Iraqi city of Mosul.” The Guardian. The Guardian, 10 Jun. 2014. Web. 17 Mar. 2017.; “Iraq Conflict: Militants 'Seize' City of Tal Afar.” BBC News. BBC, June 16, 2014.; “Iraq Crisis: Militants 'Seize Tikrit' after Taking Mosul.” BBC News. BBC, June 11, 2014.

[67] Pizzi, Michael. “In declaring a caliphate, Islamic State draws a line in the sand.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 30 Jun. 2014. Web. 3 Jul. 2014.

[68] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 304.

[69] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 303.

[70] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 305.

[71] Shekhani, Helbast. “Islamic State sold oil to Syrian regime and Turkey, commander says.” Kurdistan 24. 02 Jul. 2018.

[72] Jones, Seth G., James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler, Rolling Back the Islamic State. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1912.html. xi.

[73] Zahiyeh, Ehab. “How ISIL became a major force with only a few thousand fighters.” 19 Jun. 2014. Web. 23 Jun. 2014.

[74] "How ISIS Works." The New York Times. 16 Sept. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[75] “President Obama Makes a Statement on the Crisis in Iraq.” National Archives and Records Administration. 7 Aug 2014.; Barnard, Anne. "Opposition in Syria Is Skeptical of U.S. Airstrikes on ISIS." The New York Times. 29 Sept. 2014. Web. 13 Nov. 2014.

[76] " Statement by the President." Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, 7 Aug. 2014. Web. 30 Nov. 2014.

[77] Semple, Kirk, and Eric Schmitt. "ISIS Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Hesitate." The New York Times. 17 Oct. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[78] Hubbard, Ben. "ISIS Wave of Might Is Turning Into Ripple." The New York Times. 5 Nov. 2014. Web. 6 Nov. 2014; Cooper, Helene, and Eric Schmitt. "ISIS Official Killed in U.S. Raid in Syria, Pentagon Says." The New York Times. N.p., 16 May 2015. Web. 19 May 2015.

[79] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 115:1, 303-362. 10 Feb. 2015, 303.

[80] Kakol, Kamil, and Kareem Fahim. "Iraqi Kurds Are Joining Fight to Drive Islamic State From Kobani." The New York Times. 28 Oct. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[81] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 116:1, 307-364, 09 Feb. 2016. 309-310.

[82]“The Financing of the 'Islamic State' in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).”  European Parliament, September 2017. 17-18.

[83]“The Financing of the 'Islamic State' in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).”  European Parliament, September 2017. 17-18.

[84] Barnard, Anne, and Saad, Hwaida. “ISIS Fighters Seize Control of Syrian City of Palmyra, and Ancient Ruins.” The New York Times, May 20, 2015.; Shoichet, Catherine E. “ISIS Takes Control of Ramadi, a Key Iraqi City.” CNN, May 18, 2015.

[85] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 116:1, 307-364, 09 Feb. 2016. 309.

[86] “Boko Haram in Nigeria | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, July 29, 2019.; Gomez, Alan. “Islamic State–Sinai Province: What Is the ISIS-Linked Terrorist Group?” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, November 24, 2017.; Beech, Hannah, and Jason Gutierrez. “How ISIS Is Rising in the Philippines as It Dwindles in the Middle East.” The New York Times. The New Times, March 9, 2019.

[87] "Russia Begins Withdrawal of Forces from Syria." Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 15 Mar. 2016. Web. 17 Mar. 2017.; "Paris Attacks: Salah Abdeslam 'refused to Blow Himself Up' BBC News." BBC News, 1 Apr. 2016. Web. 17 Mar. 2017.; “Brussels Attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek bombs kill many.” BBC. BBC, 22 Mar. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017

[88] "FBI Probes Islamic State, Terror Links to San Bernardino Massacre." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times. Web. 05 Apr. 2016.

[89] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[90] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[91] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[92] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[93] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[94] Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 118:1, 315-374, February 13, 2018. 316.; Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 117:1, 351-416, February 13, 2017. 353.

[95] “Battle for Mosul: Iraq PM Abadi Formally Declares Victory.” BBC News, July 10, 2017.; “How the Battle for Mosul Unfolded.” BBC News, July 10, 2017.

[96]Malsin, Jared. “Raqqa Lies in Ruins as ISIS Near Defeat as Military Force.” Time.

[97] Operation Inherent Resolve And Other Overseas Contingency Operations - Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress, October 1, 2018‒December 31, 2018. 20-21.

[98] Callimachi, Rukmini, Jin Wu, and Derek Watkins. “ISIS Lost Its Last Territory in Syria. But the Attacks Continue.” New York Times, March 23, 2019.

[99] Callimachi, Rukmini, Jin Wu, and Derek Watkins. “ISIS Lost Its Last Territory in Syria. But the Attacks Continue.” New York Times, March 23, 2019.

[100] Knights, Michael. “The Islamic State Inside Iraq: Losing Power or Preserving Strength?” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: CTC Sentinel 11, no. 11 (December 2018). 2.

[101] Al-Hashimi, Hisham, and Renad Mansour. “ISIS Inc.” Foreign Policy. January 16, 2018.

[102] Lister, Charles. “Trump Says ISIS Is Defeated. Reality Says Otherwise.” Politico Magazine, March 18, 2019.

[103] Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls.” New York Times, March 23, 2019.

[104] Lister, Charles. “Trump Says ISIS Is Defeated. Reality Says Otherwise.” Politico Magazine, March 18, 2019.

[105] Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls.” New York Times, March 23, 2019.

[106] Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls.” New York Times, March 23, 2019.

[107] Jeffrey, James F. "ISIS Prisoners and Families." Wilson Center for International Scholars, December 22, 2020; Méheut, Constant. “Pressuring France to Bring Them Home, Women Who Joined ISIS Stage Hunger Strike.” The New York Times, February 21, 2021.

[108] Barnes, Julia and Eric Schmitt. "Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Northern Syria." New York Times, October 13, 2019.

[109] Clarke, Colin. "How the U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Provides a Boost to ISIS." RAND, October 21, 2019.

[110] McKernan, Bethan. "At least 750 Isis affiliates escape Syria camp after Turkish shelling." The Guardian, October 13, 2019.

[111] Browne, Gareth. "Up to 100 ISIS members escape Al Hol camp." The National, October 20, 2019.

[112] Swann, Glenn, Finbarr Sheehy, Cath Levett and Matt Fidler. "Visual guide to the raid that killed Isis leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi". The Guardian, October 31, 2019.

[113] ABC News. "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi given burial at sea, afforded religious rites, US officials say." ABC News, October 28, 2019.

[114] ABC News. "Islamic State names new leader, confirms death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in US raid." ABC News, October 31, 2019.

[115] Husham al-Hashimi. "ISIS’s New Leadership: Past Lessons in a New Strategic Environment." Center for Global Policy, August 4, 2020.

[116] Husham al-Hashimi. "ISIS’s New Leadership: Past Lessons in a New Strategic Environment." Center for Global Policy, August 4, 2020.

[117] Husham al-Hashimi. "ISIS’s New Leadership: Past Lessons in a New Strategic Environment." Center for Global Policy, August 4, 2020.

[118] UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. "The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism." Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, December 2020. 5.

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[121] Lubold, Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. "U.S. Drawing Up Plans to Withdraw Troops From Iraq, Afghanistan." The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2020.

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

October 28, 2002: JTJ militants assassinated U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officer Laurence Foley outside his home in Jordan (1 killed, 0 wounded).[1]

August 19, 2003: JTJ bombed the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad (23 killed, 100+ wounded).[2]

August 28, 2003: JTJ bombed the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, Iraq (85 killed, unknown wounded).[3]

May 7, 2004: JTJ leader Zarqawi beheaded American civilian worker Nicholas Berg in Iraq (1 killed, 0 wounded).[4]

November 9, 2005: AQI bombed western hotels in Amman, Jordan (57 killed, unknown wounded).[5]

February 22, 2006: AQI bombed the Shiite Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraq, which is located 65 miles north of Baghdad. The attack sparked retaliation against 100 or more Sunni mosques (no reported casualties).[6]

August 2009: AQI claimed responsibility for the bombings of several government buildings in Baghdad (250 killed, 1000+ wounded).[7]

May 2010: AQI carried out attacks across Iraq in response to the killings of AQI leaders Masri and Baghdadi (85 killed, 300+ wounded).[8]

March 21, 2012: AQI claimed responsibility for attacks across eight cities carried out together in just under six hours. Shiite civilians and Iraqi police officers, security forces, and government officials were targeted in Karbala, Kirkuk, and Baghdad (46 killed, 200 wounded).[9]

July 22, 2013: AQI attacked Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons in Iraq, freeing approximately 800 prisoners with Al Qaeda affiliations (26 Killed, unknown wounded).[10]

June 10, 2014: ISIS took control of Mosul (unknown casualties).[11]

July - August 2014: ISIS took control of Raqqa, Syria (unknown casualties).[12]

August 2014: ISIS beheaded American captive James Foley and released a video of the murder. The video garnered international attention. ISIS proceeded to behead more British and American hostages in the coming months (1+ killed, 0 wounded)[13]

August 2014: Over a period of two weeks, ISIS executed 700 members of the al-Sheitaat tribe in the Deir al-Zor province of Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The al-Sheitaat tribe and ISIS had begun fighting in July 2014 (700+ killed, unknown wounded).[14]

October 22, 2014: IS member Michael Zehaf-Bibeau opened fire at the Canadian National War Memorial, killing a Canadian solider. He then stormed the Canadian parliament before being shot and killed by authorities. ISIS claimed that the attack was a direct call to action (2 killed, 3 wounded).[15]

October 29, 2014: ISIS publicly executed several members of a Sunni tribe, the Abu Nimr, that had been resisting ISIS’s advance in the Anbar province of western Iraq. Reports on the number of dead range from forty-six to over three hundred. The reports also differ on whether or not women and children were killed along with men (46+ killed, unknown wounded).[16]

May 15, 2015: ISIS seized Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, from Iraqi security forces, which were supported by Shiite militias and American airstrikes. ISIS had controlled areas around Ramadi for almost a year and a half before taking the city (500+ killed, unknown wounded).[17]

November 13, 2015: Eleven IS members killed 130 civilians and injured 100 more in a series of attacks in Paris, France. Gunman and suicide bombers attacked a concert hall, a soccer stadium, restaurants, and bars in the French capital. Within the days following the attack, nine of the IS operatives were killed. One operative remained on the run until he was captured in Brussels on March 18, 2016.[18] According to French President François Hollande, the attacks were planned in Syria and organized in Belgium (130 killed, 100 wounded).[19]

January 14, 2016: Five IS militants armed with suicide explosives and handguns attacked a Starbucks and a police station in Jakarta, Indonesia. One Canadian civilian, one Indonesian civilian, and five attackers were killed (7 killed, 23 wounded).[20]

March 22, 2016: Members of the Islamic State set off three nail bombs in Brussels, Belgium. Two bombs were detonated in the Brussels Airport, and one bomb exploded in the Maalbek Metro Station. In the two days following the bombings, European authorities arrested eleven Islamic State militants that have been linked to this attack and the November 2015 attack in Paris, France (31 killed, 340 wounded).[21]

May 23, 2017: ISIS operative Salman Abedi detonated a bomb at an Ariana Grande pop concert in Manchester, United Kingdom (23 killed, 250+ wounded).[22]

June 7, 2017: Eight gunmen and suicide bombers simultaneously attacked Iranian parliament and the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran, Iran. This was IS’s first major attack within Iran (12 killed, 42 wounded).[23]

August 17, 2017: A van driver plowed through a crowded plaza in Barcelona, maiming dozens of pedestrians. IS claimed responsibility, but it is unclear if the attack was actually organized by IS or if it was merely inspired by the group’s ideology. It was Spain’s deadliest terrorist attack in over a decade (13 killed, 80 wounded).[24]

October 31, 2017: Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, an Uzbek national with alleged ties to IS, drove a rented van through a crowded sidewalk in New York, maiming and killing more than a dozen individuals. He left a note at the scene stating that the attack was carried out in the name of IS (8 killed, 12 wounded).[25]

November 24, 2017: IS-affiliated militants stormed a mosque in Bir al-Abed, Egypt and massacred hundreds of worshippers. The attack was revenge for the town’s cooperation with the Egyptian government in identifying suspected IS militants. Bir al-Abedr was also targeted because many of its residents practiced Sufism, a mystical form of Islam that IS considers polytheistic and evil (311 killed, 128 wounded).[26]

January 15, 2018: Twin suicide bombers attacked Tayran square, a crowded plaza where day laborers go to find work. The bombings were the group’s first major attack in Baghdad after the Iraqi government declared victory against IS in December 2017 (38 killed, 105 wounded).[27]

April 22, 2018: A suicide bomber attacked a voter registration center in a predominately Shia neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan. This was the fourth attack in a series of bombings leading up to Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections in October (57 killed, 119 wounded).[28]

May 2, 2018: Suicide bombers attacked a United Nations-led electoral commission in Tripoli, Libya. The attack was intended to disrupt international efforts to stabilize Libya (12 killed, 7 wounded).[29]

May 13, 2018: A family of six simultaneously detonated suicide bombs at three churches in Surabaya, Indonesia. Another bomb from an affiliated militant family prematurely exploded at the house of the bomb maker, killing two members of the family. The next day another family detonated a suicide bomb on their motorbike while driving into police headquarters, killing all members of the family and injuring police and civilians. These attacks were the first successful IS mission in Indonesia since 2016 and the first suicide bombings involving women and children in Indonesia (20 killed, 41 wounded).[30]

July 13, 2018: Suicide bombers attacked the convoy of a politician campaigning for a legislative seat in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. The candidate, Nawabzada Siraj Raisani, was killed in the attack. Hundreds of others were killed or wounded. The attack is the second deadliest in Pakistan’s history (149 killed, 186 wounded).[31]

July 25, 2018: Islamic State militants attacked the city of Sweida in southwest Syria, detonating suicide bombs and using other weapons to kill large numbers of civilians. The region has a large Druze population and was nominally under government control throughout the civil war. IS militants reportedly woke up families in the hours before dawn and silently killed hundreds in their homes before detonating suicide bombs later in the day (215 killed, 200+ wounded).[32]

September 22, 2018: During a military parade in Ahvaz, Iran, four militants disguised in military uniforms opened fire on a crowd of soldiers and civilian onlookers. Iranian officials blamed the United States and its regional allies for the attacks; however, the Islamic State later took credit and vowed to undertake more attacks in Iran (25+ killed, 60 wounded).[33]

December 2018: Cherif Chekatt, a French national radicalized in prison, opened fire at a Christmas market in Strasbourg, France (5 killed, 11 wounded).[34]

January 27, 2019: IS-affiliated militants set off two bombs at a church in the southern Philippines. The bombing came a week after local voters rejected a referendum for inclusion in an autonomous Muslim region. Separatist Islamist groups in the Philippines had been demanding autonomy for years, and the attacks have been described as a form of revenge against the local population (20 killed, 81 wounded).[35]

April 21, 2019: Suicide bombers and gunmen attacked three hotels and three Catholic churches in coordinated attacks in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The militants were from National Thowheed Jama’ath, a group with connections to IS. Photos showing National Thowheed Jama’ath group members pledging their allegiance to IS were released by Amaq News Agency after the attack occurred (300+ killed, 500+ wounded).[36]

August 17, 2019: A suicide bomber detonated an explosive belt at a Shiite wedding in western Kabul, Afghanistan. IS' Afghan affiliate claimed responsibility for the bombing (63+ killed, 180+ wounded).[37]

February 2, 2020: Sudesh Amman, a British national, stabbed and injured two people on the Streatham High Road in south London, United Kingdom. Armed police shot and killed Amman shortly after the attack began. Amman reportedly declared allegiance to IS in a video, and IS later claimed responsibility for Amman's attack. The group held that Amman was responding to IS' call for attacks on citizens of countries bombing IS territory in the Middle East (0 killed, 2 wounded).[38]

November 2, 2020: A lone gunman attacked several locations in downtown Vienna, Austria, including a plaza near the city's main synagogue. Armed police shot and killed the attacker. Police investigators later determined that the attacker, whose identity authorities have not disclosed, was an IS sympathizer. As of April 2021, it is the most recent major IS attack in Europe (4 killed, 13 wounded).[39]

January 21, 2021: Two suicide bombers detonated bombs in a crowded marketplace in eastern Baghdad. Iraqi Health and Interior Ministry spokespeople noted that the attack was the deadliest in Baghdad since 2018.[40] IS claimed responsibility for the bombings via a statement released on the messaging app Telegram later that day, which stated they intended to kill Shiites (32 killed, 110 wounded).[41]

March 24, 2021 - April 4, 2021: An IS affiliate group, known as the Islamic State Central Africa Province or ISIS-Mozambique, took over the town of Palma in northern Mozambique.[42] Militants targeted government, military, and civilian personnel and buildings. On March 29, IS claimed responsibility for the attack via a statement released through its Amaq News Network.[43] However, the relationship between IS and IS-Central Africa has been described as “loose” and several observers doubt that IS was directly involved in the attacks.[44] Government forces did not completely reclaim control of Palma until April 4, 2021.[45] An estimated 40,000 people were displaced by the fighting, and the number of casualties is unknown (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[46]

 

[1] "Jamaat al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad," GlobalSecurity.org, 6 Dec. 2006. Web. 26 Jan. 2010; "US Diplomat Shot Dead in Jordan." BBC News. BBC, 28 Oct. 2002. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[2] "Paris Attacks: Islamic State Group 'releases Video of Attackers' - BBC News." BBC News. Web. 28 Feb. 2016.

[3] "Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night - BBC News." BBC News. Web. 28 Feb. 2016.

[4] "ISIS 'minister of War' Likely Killed in US Airstrike in Syria, Defense Official Says | Fox News." Fox News. FOX News Network, 2016. Web. 17 Mar. 2017

[5] Schmidt, Michael S., and Mark Mazzetti. "A Top ISIS Leader Is Killed in an Airstrike, the Pentagon Says." The New York Times. The New York Times, 2016. Web. 7 Mar. 2017

[6] “Brussels Attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek bombs kill many.” BBC. BBC, 22 Mar. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017

[7] “Brussels Attacks Death Toll Lowered to 32.” The World Post. Huffington Post, 29 Mar. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

[8] Sawyer, Patrick and Chazan, David. “British victim of Brussels attack confirmed dead as slow identification of bodies continues.” The Telegraph. The Telegraph, 25 Mar. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

[9] Paravicini, Giulia. “Brussels ISIL cell ‘initially’ planned to ‘strike France again.’”Politico, 10 Apr. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

[10] “Attentats du 13 novembre: Osoma Krayem soupconné d’avoir fréquenté l’atelier de confection des bombes.” Le Monde. Le Monde, 19 Apr. 2016. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.

[11] Abbit, Beth. "The number of people injured in Manchester Arena terror rises to 250." Manchester Evening News. MEN Media, 22 Jun. 2017. Web. 8 Oct. 2017.

[12] White, Jeffery. "Military Implications of the Syrian Regime's Defeat in Raqqa." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 27 Aug. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.

[13] Yourish, Karen. "The Fates of 23 ISIS Hostages in Syria." The New York Times. N.p., 23 Oct. 2014. Web. 09 Jan. 2015.

[14] Holmes, Oliver, and Suleiman Al-Khalidi. "Islamic State Executed 700 People from Syrian Tribe: Monitoring Group." Reuters. 16 Aug. 2014. Web. 6 Nov. 2014.

[15] "ISIS Goes Global: Over 60 Attacks in 20 Countries." Fox News. 2016. Web. 28 Feb. 2016; “Ottawa shooting: A day of chaos leaves soldier, gunman dead.” CBC News. October 22, 2014.

[16] Stout, David. "ISIS Massacres Sunni Tribe in Iraq." Time. 4 Nov. 2014. Web. 6 Nov. 2014; Morris, Loveday, and Mustafa Salim. "Islamic State Publicly Kills at Least 46 Sunni Opponents in Captured Iraqi City." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 29 Oct. 2014. Web. 6 Nov. 2014.

[17] Arango, Tim. "Key Iraqi City Falls to ISIS as Last of Security Forces Flee." The New York Times. N.p., 17 May 2015. Web. 18 May 2015.

[18] "Paris Attacks: Salah Abdeslam 'refused to Blow Himself Up' - BBC News." BBC News. Web.

[19] "Paris Attacks: Islamic State Group 'releases Video of Attackers' - BBC News." BBC News. Web. 28 Feb. 2016; "Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night - BBC News." BBC News. Web. 28 Feb. 2016.

[20] Cochrane, Joe, and Thomas Fuller. "Jakarta Attack Raises Fears of ISIS’ Spread in Southeast Asia." The New York Times. The New York Times, 2016. Web; "Indonesia: ISIS's New Battlefront." Time. Time. Web.

[21] Graham-Harrison, Emma, Arthur Neslen, and Patrick Greenfield. "Brussels Attacks: Last Gasp of Isis Terror in Europe, or Sign of Growing Threat?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 2016. Web. 04 Apr. 2016; "Three More Arrested in Brussels Police Operation over Attacks." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 2016. Web. 04 Apr. 2016; Rubin, Alissa J., Aurelien Breeden, and Anita Raghavan. "Strikes Claimed by ISIS Shut Brussels and Shake European Security." The New York Times. The New York Times, 2016. Web. 04 Apr. 2016.

[22] Kalamachi, Rukmini and Schmitt, Eric. “Manchester Bomber Met With ISIS Unit in Libya, Officials Say.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 3 Jun. 2017. Web. 8 Oct. 2017; Abbit, Beth. “The number of people injured in Manchester Arena terror attack rises to 250.” Manchester Evening News. MEN Media, 22 Jun. 2017. Web. 8 Oct. 2017.

[23]McKernan, Bethan. "Tehran attacks: ISIS claims responsibility for 'first major attack on Iran." The Independent, June 7, 2015.

[24] Bolon, Anne-Sophie, Palko Karasz, and Kames C. McKinley Jr. "Van Hits Pedestrians in Deadly Barcelona Terror Attack." New York Times, August 17, 2017.

[25] Prokupecz, Shimon, Eric Levenson, Brynn Gingras, and Steve Almasy. "Note found near truck claims Manhattan attack done for ISIS, source says." CNN. November 6, 2017.

[26]Youssef, Nour. "Motives in Egypt’s Deadliest Terrorist Attack: Religion and Revenge." New York Times, December 2017.

[27] Shaheen, Kareem. "Suicide attack in Baghdad kills at least 38." The Guardian. January 15. 2018.

[28] "Afghanistan: Kabul voter centre suicide attack kills 57." BBC News. April 22, 2018.

[29] Elumami, Ahmed. "Suicide attackers storm HQ of Libya's election commission, 12 dead." Reuters, May 2, 2018.

[30] Schulze, Kirsten. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Treat in Indonesia." Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point - CTC Sentinel 11, no. 6 June/July 2018. 1.

[31] Ali Shah, Syed, Sophia Saifi, and Judith Vonberg. "At least 149 killed in Pakistan terror strike targeting political rally." CNN. July 16, 2018.

[32] "Syria war: More than 200 dead in suicide attacks." BBC News. July 25, 2018.

[33] Sulaivany, Karzan. "Islamic State warns Iran more to follow after Ahvaz attack: report." Kurdistan 24, September 26, 2018.; Pérez-Peña, Richard. "Attack on Military Parade in Iran Kills at Least 25." New York Times, September 22, 2018.

[34] "Strasbourg shooting: What we know." BBC News, December 16, 2018.

[35] Gutierrez, Jason. "Philippines Cathedral Bombing Kills 20." New York Times, January 27, 2019.

[36] Dearden, Lizzie. “Isis Claims Responsibility for Sri Lanka Easter Massacre.” The Independent, April 23, 2019.; Withnall, Adam. “Sri Lanka Government Reveals Suicide Bombers Responsible for Deadly Blasts That Killed Hundreds.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, April 22, 2019.

[37] Constable, Pamela and Sharif Hassan. "Islamic State claims suicide attack on Kabul wedding that killed 63." The Washington Post, August 18, 2019.

[38] Dearden, Lizzie. "Streatham terror attack: Isis claims responsibility for stabbing by supporter Sudesh Amman." The Independent, February 3, 2020; Davies, Caroline and Simon Murphy. "Sudesh Amman: how did science student become Streatham jihadist?" The Guardian, February 3, 2020.

[39] BBC News. “Vienna shooting: What we know about 'Islamist terror' attack.” BBC, November 4, 2020.; Pancevski, Bojan, Ruth Bender, and William Boston. “Vienna Shooting Kills Four, Injures Several in Terrorist Act.” The Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2020.

[40] Arraf, Jane. "Suicide Bombings in Crowded Baghdad Market Kill at Least 32." The New York Times, January 21, 2021.

[41] Al-Araby. "IS claims Baghdad twin bombing that killed 32, wounded 110." Al-Araby, January 21, 2021.

[42] “Cabo Ligado Weekly: 29 March-4 April.” Cabo Ligado Conflict Observatory, April 2021. https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-29-march-4-april-…

[43] Christina Goldbaum. “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Mozambique Attack.” The New York Times, March 30, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack…; “Islamic State Claims Dayslong Attack on Mozambique Town.” VOA News, March 29, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/africa/islamic-state-claims-dayslong-attack-moz…; Emilia Columbo and Austin C. Doctor. “Foreign Fighters and the Trajectory of Violence in Northern Mozambique.” War on the Rocks, April 13, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/foreign-fighters-and-the-trajectory-o…

[44] Christina Goldbaum. “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Mozambique Attack.” The New York Times, March 30, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack…

[45] “Cabo Ligado Weekly: 29 March-4 April.” Cabo Ligado Conflict Observatory, April 2021. https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-29-march-4-april-…

[46] Associated Press. “40,000 Displaced in North Mozambique After Assault on Palma.” U.S. News and Word Report, April 20, 2021. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-20/40-000-displaced-…