Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
HuJI was associated with Deobandi school of thought within Sunni Islam, a movement that originated in Uttar Pradesh, India, where HuJI had extensive operations. The group has described itself as the “second line of defense for every Muslim,” and it aimed to establish Islamic rule in Pakistan and India by waging attacks and promoting the Islamization of Pakistani society. During the Soviet-Afghan war, HuJI attracted more madrasa students than other Jihadi organizations because of their emphasis on conforming to Shariah law, their close relationship with the Taliban, and their emphasis on practical jihad.[77] Originally established to fight Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, HuJI reoriented itself to challenge Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989.[78]
HuJI-B seeks to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh and has been known to share Taliban ideology, evidenced by HuJI-B’s slogan, “Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan” (“We will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan”).[79]
HuJI-A’s ideology stems from the Deobandi Sunni philosophy of HuJI, but it is also rooted in Rohingya nationalism and resistance to the government of Myanmar.[80] The group’s stated goals are to provide military training to young Arakanese men, undertake guerilla operations to liberate the state of Rakhine from rule by Myanmar, and provide aid for the welfare of Rohingya migrants in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.[81] HuJI-A is led by Pakistani-based Rohingyas whose linkages to AQIS and other global terrorist organizations continue to radicalize the ideology of Rohingya nationalists in Myanmar.[82]
HuJI has been linked to the deceased Taliban leader Mullah Omar. 25 HuJI members were part of the Taliban cabinet and judiciary in Afghanistan before the regime’s overthrow in 2001.[83]
HuJI-B has extensive political ties in Bangladesh. Tarique Raman, the current leader of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), was sentenced to life in prison for his involvement in the HuJI-B-orchestrated 2004 Grenade Bombing in Dhaka.[84] 37 other HuJI militants were implicated for this attack, including members of the BNP and former members of several Bangladeshi police and intelligence services.[85] The leaders of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), Islami Oitya Jote (IOJ), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI Bangladesh) publicly denied HuJI’s role in domestic terrorism until 2005 when the Bangladesh government formally designated the organization as terrorists.[86]
The style and targets of HuJI’s militancy have changed throughout the organization’s history. Little is known about HuJI’s involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war, but one report describes Mullah Omar’s appreciation for HuJI fighters in a battle against the Northern Alliance in which 300 HuJI members were killed.[87] HuJI fighters engaged in similar guerilla warfare against the Indian government in J&K during the 1990’s and early 2000’s. The South Asian Terrorism Portal reported 650 HuJI deaths in a 2002 battle with the Indian army in Kashmir.[88]
After the 9/11 attacks, HuJI’s militant activities in Northern India decreased, and HuJI transitioned to carrying out attacks on secular and progressive individuals including intellectuals, writers, politicians, and journalists in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. In 2000, HuJI militants assassinated a senior Bangladeshi journalist for making a documentary on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HuJI was also the prime suspect in the 2000 assassination attempt on Bangladesh’s then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was also the leader of the secular, center-left Awami League.[89] HuJI’s violent tactics have ranged from single assassinations to medium- and large-scale bombings, most recently at a Delhi courthouse in 2011.[90] The group operates in small, autonomous cells, each carrying out independent attacks.[91] As of 2017, HuJI-A has carried out similar small-scale attacks against Myanmar’s government along the border with Bangladesh.[92]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
1980-1989: HuJI was the first Pakistani-based jihadist group to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[93]
April 14, 2001: A series of bombs were detonated at a cultural event celebrating the Bengali New Year at Ramna Batamul in Dhaka, Bangladesh. HuJI claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed a police officer and a HuJI militant (9 killed, 17 wounded).[94]
January 22, 2002: HuJI was involved in the attack on American Center in Kolkata. The Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), which claimed responsibility for the attack, was affiliated to HuJI. Three HuJI militants were arrested. These militants told authorities the attack was carried out by a combination of Bangladeshi migrants and HuJI militants in India who were trained at ISI-backed training camps in Pakistan (5 killed, 20 wounded).[95]
May 21, 2004: A bomb was detonated at the Shah Jalal Shrine in Sylhet, Bangladesh, killing three and wounding 100. The intended target was the British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury.[96] In 2008, three HuJI-B militants including leader Mufti Hannan were sentenced to death for the attack (3 killed, 100 wouded).[97]
August 21, 2004: HuJI-B militants detonated grenades at an Awami league rally in Dhaka, killing 24 and wounding 400. Their primary target was politician Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the Awami League and political opponent of the BNP.[98] Members of her party formed a human shield around her, protecting her from the grenade. In 2018, 38 HuJI militants including numerous BNP political leaders were sentenced to death or life in prison for their involvement in the attack (24 killed, 400 wounded).[99]
March 2, 2006: HuJI was responsible for the suicide bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, which killed U.S. diplomat David Foy (4 killed, 48 wounded).[100]
March 7, 2006: HuJI was allegedly responsible for three synchronized bombings across the Hindu holy city of Varanasi. Two blasts occurred at Sankat Mochan, a temple where hundreds of pilgrims were visiting. The third blast occurred at the railway station in Varanasi. Six additional bombs were reportedly diffused throughout the city (28 killed, 101 wounded).[101]
September 7, 2011: A briefcase bomb exploded in the Indian high court reception hall. HuJI claimed responsibility for the attack, but this was not confirmed by India’s National Investigation Agency. Another terrorist group, the Indian Mujahadeen (IM), also claimed responsibility. (15 killed, 90 wounded).[102]
HuJI’s community relationships revolve around securing funding and recruiting members to support their operations.
HuJI’s recruitment strategies have evolved throughout its existence. HuJI recruited members from the loosely organized pool of foreign nationals fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan and from Pakistani madrasas in Punjab and NWFP.[106] Recruits were attracted to HuJI because of its commitment to upholding Shariah law, its close relationship with the Taliban, and its extensive network within Afghanistan that allowed fighters to quickly join battle.[107] These individuals joined a complex system of overlapping organizations which comprised the Pakistani Harakat movement.[108] After the war in Afghanistan ended, guerilla fighters returned to their home countries and eventually created two new organized branches, each of which adopted unique goals and recruitment strategies: HuJI-A (formed in 1988) and HuJI-B (formed in 1992).
The main HuJI branch based in Pakistan largely recruited individuals from Indian and Pakistani madrassas.[109] The HuJI-B branch mainly recruited from Bangladeshi madrassas and had extensive ties to Islamist political groups in the country including the Bangladeshi National Party (BNP) and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ).[110] The HuJI-A branch was initially composed of ethnic Rohingyas based in Karachi, Pakistan, and it recruited dissatisfied young Rohingya men from Myanmar to carry out attacks along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. HuJI-A eventually set up camps in Southeast Bangladesh near Cox’s Bazaar.[111]
Unlike other militant groups operating in the region, the main branch of HuJI is not known to provide community services and little is known about the public opinion of HuJI in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in J&K.[112] Public opinion of HuJI and HuJI-B in Bangladesh and India appears to be negative since the group has frequently targeted civilians. After the execution of HuJI-B leader Mufti Hannan in 2017, residents of Gopalganj (Hannan’s hometown) refused to accord him burial rights in his ancestral village.[113]
HuJI-A has had a more symbiotic relationship with local communities than HuJI and HuJI-B. One of the stated goals of HuJI-A is to provide aid and improve the welfare of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.[114] The charitable ambitions of HuJI have made them less active as a militant organization and a large portion of their funding goes to migrants and religious schools in Rohingya refugee communities in Bangladesh and Pakistan.[115]
HuJI has developed affiliates and merged with other organizations throughout its existence. In the early 1990s, HuJI member Fazlur Rehman Khalil broke away to form another militant organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM). In 1993, under pressure from ISI and Deobandi clerics, HuJI combined forces with HuM and formed Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) to begin operations in Jammu and Kashmir.[116] Following the U.S. designation of HuA as a terrorist organization in 1997, the group terminated their union and reverted to operating independently in order to evade authorities.[117]
HuJI has a history of cooperating with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. At least 25 HuJI members served in the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar provided joint training for HuJI, Taliban police, and Taliban army recruits.[118] HuJI leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar served as a link between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including arranging meetings between top leaders of the two groups.[119] Al Qaeda and HuJI shared some training camps, and the relationship between the groups was strengthened by their mutual ties to the Taliban. Osama Bin Laden used HuJI as part of his support network inside Pakistan, specifically to convey messages, instructions, and funds. Additionally, evidence from a 2012 interview with HuJI commander Jalaluddin indicates HuJI provided funding for 9/11 by funneling ransom money from a kidnapping to hijacker Mohammad Atta.[120] Some evidence also indicates HuJI operatives may have been involved in hiding or transporting Bin Laden in Pakistan after 9/11.[121]
Additionally, HuJI has been connected with groups that share similar goals and ideologies, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). HuJI provided militants for JeM operations as late as 2008. According to an accord between the two groups, JeM compensated the family members of any HuJI member killed in an attack.[122] HuJI, HuM, HuA, LeT, and JeM have been more broadly categorized as the Pakistani Harakat Movement, a cluster of militant Deobandi organizations with overlapping members, goals, and activity.[123]
HuJI-B, a branch of HuJI formed in Bangladesh in 1992, has had extensive relationships with groups operating in India, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. It was associated with Osama bin Laden’s World Islamic Front for Jihad and operated through the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh led by Fazlur Rahman.[124] In 1998, HuJI-B member Shaikh Abdur Rahman founded Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), a group who focused on waging jihad against the government in Bangladesh.[125] In Myanmar, HuJI-B operatives supported the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) throughout the 1990s, jointly running training camps and sharing arms caches.[126] In India, HuJI-B has operationally coordinated its attacks with the cooperation of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). SIMI cadres have provided shelter and logistical help to HuJI’s Bangladesh unit (HuJI-B) prior to attacks and some SIMI cadres have joined HuJI-B.[127] Throughout the late 2000’s the group has supported the growth of India Mujahedeen (IM), an organization responsible for numerous large-scale terrorist attacks in India.[128] HuJI also maintains links with militant groups operating in India's northeast, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). HuJI reportedly ran ULFA's training camps in Bangladesh in the 2000’s.[129]
HuJI Arakan (HuJI-A) was formed in 1988 by Maulana Abdul Quddus, a Pakistani national of Rohingya origin. HuJI-A militant Hafiz Tohar was chosen by Quddus to receive special training in Pakistan. After returning to Myanmar, he created a new militant organization, Aqa Mul Mujahideen (AMM).[130] HuJI-A and AMM operate closely. As of 2017, AMM has been active in launching small scale attacks against the Burmese government in the border region between Myanmar and Bangladesh.[131]
The imprisonment and death of HuJI leaders in Pakistan and Bangladesh and its designation as a terrorist organization have decreased the group’s strength since 2011. Many of its cadres appear to have assimilated into other militant organizations, including AQIS. Many current leaders of AQIS in 2019 reportedly began their militant careers with HuJI.[132]
HuJI's anti-India operations were historically planned by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), mostly from the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka, however Pakistani government support decreased post-9/11 after HuJI was designated as a terrorist organization. Reports indicate that ISI also provided military training to HuJI-B recruits in camps in Bangladesh.[133]
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[77] Rānā, M. (2006). A to Z of Jehadi organizations in Pakistan. Lahore: Mashal Books. 267.
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[81] A to Z 276
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