Los Urabeños:

There are no known name changes for this group; however, the group is known by several different names.

• Los Urabeños: The name “Los Urabeños” comes from “Urabá,” the region in which the group originated.[1] Los Urabeños is the name most commonly used in association with the group.
• Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC): In English, this name means the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.[2]
• Clan de Gulfo: The name “Clan de Gulfo” is used by the Colombian government to refer to the group, meaning “Gulf Clan” in English.[3]

Los Rastrojos:

• Los Rastrojos: The name “Los Rastrojos” comes from the last name of the former leader of the group, David Rastrojo.[4] It is the name that the group currently uses and has historically used, aside from its attempts to negotiate with the Colombian government in 2003.
• Rondas Campesinas Populares (RCP): In English, this name means the “Popular Peasant Patrols.” Los Rastrojos used this name when they were attempting to enter into talks with the Colombian government in 2003 while the group was still a part of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).[5]

Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC):

• Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC): ERPAC is a name for a collection of groups that formed after the demobilization of the AUC. In 2011, ERPAC officially demobilized; however, many dissidents created splinter groups known as “Los Puntilleros.”[6]
• Los Puntilleros: Los Puntilleros is the name of the ERPAC dissident groups “Los Libertadores del Vichada” and “Bloque Meta,” who did not demobilize in 2011 during ERPAC’s formal demobilization process. The group got its name by working as a personal army for Colombian drug lord Oscar Mauricio Pachon, who went by the alias Puntilla.[7]

• 2008: 10,200 (Coporación Nuevo Arco Iris)[1]
• 2008: 4,000 (the Colombian Government)[2]
• 2014: 3,400+ (Los Urabeños, 2,650)[3]
• 2014: 3,870 (National Police)[4]
• 2014: 7,000 (Institute of Studies for Development and Peace)[5]
• 2014: 10,000 (Human Rights Watch)[6]
• 2014: 3,410 (El Tiempo)[7]
• 2016: ~2,800 members of Los Urabeños (Business Insider)[8]
• 2017: 1,500 members of Los Urabeños (Business Insider)[9]
• 2017: 310 members of Los Rastrojos (InSight Crime)[10]
• 2019: 450 members of Los Puntilleros (Colombia Reports)[11]

BACRIM groups earn money primarily from the cocaine trade and from extortion, illegal gold mining, and domestic distribution of drugs.[1] BACRIM factions specialize in cocaine production but historically have not produced the raw coca base themselves. Instead, they have been reliant on guerrilla groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for coca base that they turn into cocaine and sell as coca paste.[2] BACRIM organizations specialize in trafficking shipments of drugs through its territory and to the Caribbean coast, as well as to Colombia’s borders with Panama and Venezuela.[3] For its transportation services, BACRIM groups charge 10% of the price of the package being trafficked.[4]

BACRIM groups primarily trade with Mexican drug cartels and criminal groups. BACRIM organizations receive $5,000 per kilo of cocaine they sell to Mexican drug cartels. In 2013, BACRIM factions reportedly were interested in beginning operations in Europe to increase their cocaine sale profits. In 2014, Spanish authorities dismantled one of Los Urabeños’ cells in Spain.[5] Analysts speculate that BACRIM organizations can earn three times as much per kilo of cocaine in Spain than what they do in Mexico. In addition to cocaine smuggling, BACRIM groups, especially Los Rastrojos, have smuggled gasoline out of Venezuela for profit.[6]

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The strength of BACRIM organizations’ presence throughout Colombia is debated. In 2015, BACRIM groups were believed to be active in between 130 to 170 municipalities across the country and in between 15 to 31 of the country’s 32 provinces.[1] At this time, BACRIM groups were most active in Barbacoas and in the process of expanding further in Nariño. Additionally, their presence was growing in Cordoba, Antioquia, Vichada, and Guaviare.[2] As of August 2019, Los Urabeños has been actively taking control over indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas in Alto Baudó, near the Pacific.[3] Los Urabeños has also maintained control over Uraba, a region along the Pacific coast of Colombia.[4]

Internationally, BACRIM leaders have been captured throughout Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. BACRIM factions have a very strong presence in Ecuador and eastern Venezuela, particularly in partnership with guerrilla groups there.[5] As of August 2019, Los Rastrojos maintains a base in Boca de Grita in Táchira, Venezuela, which borders Puerto Santander, Colombia.[6] In 2013, BACRIM groups reportedly considered expanding their drug operations to Italy and Spain, which is more profitable than trading with Mexican cartels.[7] As of June 2019, BACRIM organizations allegedly have ties to the Italian Mafia.[8]

BACRIM has no political agenda.[1] However, BACRIM members, particularly ex-paramilitary members, have used ties to Colombian public officials in order to protect their group’s business interests.[2]

Despite the Colombian government’s blanket refusal to legitimize any BACRIM factions as political organizations, several BACRIM groups have tried to appear as political organizations so as to be able to negotiate with the government under more favorable terms. Political military groups have protections under Colombian law that are not offered to organized crime groups, and BACRIM organizations have attempted to take advantage of this distinction. In 2003, Los Rastrojos tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the Colombian government. In an effort to appear to be a legitimate political organization, the group changed its name from “Los Rastrojos” to “Rondas Campesinas Populares” (Popular Peasant Patrols, RCP).[3] The government refused to allow the group into negotiations, so it changed its name back to “Los Rastrojos.”

Los Urabeños has also tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the Colombian government. Following the beginning of peace talks between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government in 2012, Los Urabeños began to alter its image to appear more political. The group created a website and a newspaper, and it classified itself as a “military-political organization.”[4] In 2018, the Colombian Congress created a law that outlined the terms for militant groups to demobilize.[5] There were initial negotiations between Los Urabeños and President Santos’ government, including on the application of the 2018 law to Los Urabeños. However, negotiations were suspended indefinitely when President Duque took office in August 2018. Uncertainty surrounding the demobilization and reintegration of the FARC and the Colombian government’s fulfillment of its responsibilities outlined in the 2016 peace process also contributed to the cessation of negotiations.[6]

In February 2017, Luis Carlos Villegas, the Colombian Minister of Defense declared that there were no paramilitary groups in Colombia. By making such a statement, despite recorded violence conducted by BACRIM factions, the government reiterated its position in not recognizing the BACRIM groups as paramilitary organizations. Instead, the government considers BACRIM groups to be part of organized crime and to have no legitimate political standing.[7] As of August 2019, the Colombian government has not engage in any efforts to demobilize and reintegrate of organized crime group because it does not want to give these organizations “political status.”[8]

BACRIM groups directly target Colombian police, especially in retaliation to police attacks on BACRIM organizations.[1] In 2012, Los Urabeños offered its members a reward of approximately $1,000 for each police officer they murdered.[2] BACRIM factions have also targeted indigenous and Afro-Colombian community leaders.[3] BACRIM’s “sicarios” (assassins) often assassinate uncorrupt political leaders, journalists, “sapos” (informants), and the targets chosen by elites paying for assassinations.[4]

BACRIM operations have included drug trafficking, extortion, gold mining, gambling, contraband smuggling, human trafficking, and the smuggling of gasoline.[5] Additionally, BACRIM groups have carried out assassination operations for financial gain and to maintain their authority.[6] BACRIM organizations often recruit underprivileged teenagers as “sicarios,” whom they employ and often house with other BACRIM group members.[7] In order to avoid authorities, BACRIM factions have utilized a system of “campaneros” (spotters), or unarmed people that watch for authorities and use cell phones or radio to warn the group of threats.[8]

BACRIM groups have also received tips from corrupt Colombian government, police, and military officers.[9] Though the Colombian government condemns activities of BACRIM organizations, BACRIM members rely on public officials for assistance. Through corruption and the use of bribes, BACRIM groups involve police, security forces, municipal council members, and mayors to protect their own business interests. In 2014, more than 200 anticorruption investigations of Colombian officials were allegedly undertaken to explore suspected ties with BACRIM groups.[10]

In June 2019, Colombian authorities discovered that Los Urabeños had been producing landmines at a site in Riosucio, Chocó, near the Colombia-Panama border. Experts believe that Los Urabeños planted these landmines as part of its fight against the ELN’s increasing presence in the region. Additionally, the landmines might have been intended as a scare tactic to force local populations to stay off drug trafficking routes and confine the expansion of villages.[11]

BACRIM groups maintain control of communities in their territory through the use of violence. BACRIM organizations have frequently engaged in forced displacement, sexual violence, and massacres.[1] The groups are also known for their use of extortion and political assassinations in order to coerce local populations to support the organization and its drug trafficking operations.

In impoverished, rural areas, such as along the coast of Colombia, BACRIM groups have targeted local community leaders, particularly of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Because government involvement in these regions and with these communities has historically been absent, local leaders play a large role in community formation, structure, and decision-making. Analysts speculate that BACRIM organizations attack local leaders to remove traditional sources of order and legitimacy. These leaders are often killed on the charge that they collaborated with the previous organization that was occupying the territory. This tactic gives groups space to exert their control over a given region.[2]

BACRIM groups, specifically Los Urabeños, are also known for their direct intimidation of and outreach to minors. BACRIM groups have taken over classrooms and given children (mostly teenagers) guns and cars – items that are hard to come by in rural areas.[3] Taking over classrooms serves as both an intimidation tactic as well as a recruitment platform, and providing material items acts as an incentive for minors to join the criminal gangs.

Although BACRIM groups bring violence to the regions in which they operate, they also provide protection to coca farmers growing crops in their territories. BACRIM groups that are predominantly involved in drug trafficking have an economic interest in safeguarding coca farms and ensuring some level of economic stability. Consequently, BACRIM organizations provide protection in areas where coca cultivation is a major economy, such as along the Colombian coast and in Cauca. Because President Duque’s government has dramatically increased efforts to eradicate coca production, coca farmers have grown dependent on the presence of BACRIM factions and other militant groups that are involved in the drug trade.[4] In addition to providing economic protection, BACRIM groups also claim to provide local communities protection from other militant organizations. For example, Los Urabeños has claimed to be protecting local populations in Cauca from the ELN.[5]

BACRIM groups form the basis of social and political stability for many of the regions in which they operate. BACRIM organizations instill the rule of law within their territory, and they often settle disputes between local parties. Several BACRIM factions believe in “social cleansing,” killing those who they have convicted of crimes like rape, theft, and sometimes drug addiction.[6] Some BACRIM groups have also threatened members of the LGBT community. However, as of 2017, there have not been any definitive attacks on members of the LGBT community specifically due to their sexual orientation.[7]

The involvement of BACRIM factions in the drug trade ties them to leftist guerrilla groups in Colombia, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). BACRIM groups have traded and bought drug products, namely coca base, from the FARC. Additionally, the FARC reportedly contracted BACRIM’s ‘assassins for hire,’ to provide additional militants for FARC attacks.[1] In September 2014, Los Urabeños reportedly collaborated with the FARC in an attack on Colombian police.[2] Since the demobilization of the FARC, BACRIM organizations have fought amongst themselves in the FARC’s former territory for control of its drug production and trafficking routes.

BACRIM groups have increased their interactions with the ELN since the demobilization of the FARC in 2016. Beginning in 2016-2017, BACRIM organizations like Los Rastrojos and Los Urabeños have been collaborating with the ELN on illegal drug trafficking.[3] Although Los Urabeños has cooperated with the ELN, the group has also been competing with the ELN for territory and control of drug trafficking routes. Since 2015, violence between the ELN and Los Urabeños has caused the forced displacement of approximately 50,000 people in Chocó.[4] From February to March 2019, clashes between Los Urabeños and the ELN forced the confinement of approximately 2,800 people in Bojayá, a city along two major drug trafficking routes in northern Colombia.[5]

For its international drug trafficking operations, BACRIM groups have ties to other transnational crime organizations and drug cartels. As of August 2019, Los Urabeños has established business with Mexican drug cartels like the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas.[6]

In Venezuela, the BACRIM group Los Rastrojos is allegedly allied financially with the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), Venezuela’s armed forces. The two have cooperated in gasoline smuggling from Venezuela to Colombia. However, Los Rastrojos and the GNB have also engaged in violence against each other. The GNB arrested members of Los Rastrojos, and Los Rastrojos retaliated with attacks and kidnappings of national guardsmen.[7]

BACRIM groups also have complicated relationships with other organizations falling under the BACRIM label. Los Urabeños has historically been in competition with Los Rastrojos for territory as well as economic influence in the drug trafficking industry.[8] Simultaneously, Los Urabeños is allied with Los Libertadores del Vichada.[9] Although Los Libertadores del Vichada cooperates with Los Urabeños, it has been in competition with another group in Los Puntilleros, Bloque Meta.[10]

International crime groups have historically influenced BACRIM organizations. BACRIM groups have traditionally traded with Mexican drug cartels, particularly the Sinaloa Cartel, and earn $5,000 per kilo of cocaine sold.[1] In 2013, BACRIM organizations explored the possibility of operating directly in Italy and Spain in an effort to earn more per kilo of cocaine sold.[2] As of June 2019, BACRIM groups allegedly have ties to the Italian Mafia.[3]

The United States has also influenced the leadership and the continuation of BACRIM organizations. Since around 2012, leadership in BACRIM groups, such as Los Rastrojos, have made deals with U.S. law enforcement in order to serve lighter prison sentences in the United States than what they would receive in Colombia. Leaders like Luis E. Calle Serna have turned themselves in to U.S. authorities after negotiating plea deals with the United States government. These proceedings have created divisions within the leadership of BACRIM groups like Los Rastrojos, as leaders who turn themselves over to authorities come into conflict with those who continue the organization’s militant operations.[4]