Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
Ansar Dine was a Salafi-jihadist group that aimed to establish Shariah law across Mali and targeted western civilians, especially peacekeepers in Mali.[26] Ansar Dine’s ideology closely mirrored that of AQIM, which came to view Ansar Dine as its southern arm in Mali. Unlike the MNLA, Ansar Dine did not seek independence for northern Mali but rather a country unified under Islam.[27]
In November 2012, Ansar Dine expressed its willingness to hold peace talks with regional governments in Bamako, Mali. Additionally, the group gave permission to humanitarian agencies to enter northern Mali.[28] In December 2012, Ansar Dine participated in talks with the government of Burkina Faso and the MNLA to establish a cessation of hostilities, but the talks did not yield a lasting peace.[29]
Ansar Dine militants employed suicide attacks, explosive-laden vehicles, rockets, mortars, grenades and rifles to weaken its primary targets, which included the French and Malian militaries, the Malian police force, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and after the initial occupation of land in northern Mali, the MNLA.[30] The group also possessed anti-aircraft weapons.[31]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
March 2012: Following the military coup in Mali, Ansar Dine, along with AQIM, MUJAO, and the MNLA, launched an offensive and eventually took control of northern Mali. In its attack of Aguelhok, a village in the Kidal region, Ansar Dine forces killed 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapped at least 32 (unknown casualties).[32]
June 2012: Ansar Dine and MUJAO fought alongside one another in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in northern Mali against the MNLA, ultimately seizing Gao, Timbuktu and their environs (unknown casualties).[33]
October 23, 2013: Four Ansar Dine suicide bombers detonated cars saddled with explosives at the United Nations checkpoint in Tessalit in the Kidal region of Mali, killing peacekeepers and civilians (7 killed, 6 wounded).[34]
August 3, 2015: Militants ambushed the Malian National Guard base in Gourma Rharous in the Timbuktu region of Mali, killing 11 Malian soldiers (11 killed, 1 wounded).[35]
December 24-25, 2015: Ansar Dine militants attacked a MNLA base in Talhandak village in Kidal, Mali and allegedly took over the village (10 killed, unknown wounded).[36]
February 12, 2016: A suicide bomber detonated a truck bomb on a U.N. base in the Kidal region. 6 peacekeepers died in the attack and the resulting heavy weapons fire. Ansar Dine claimed the attack was a response to the German president’s pledge to send soldiers to support MINUSMA (6 killed, unknown wounded).[37]
July 19, 2016: Militants attacked a Malian military base in Nampala, with at least 19 Malian soldiers killed and 5 kidnapped (19 killed, unknown wounded).[38]
November 7, 2016: Ansar Dine forces temporarily took control of a national guard post near Gourma in the Timbuktu region. The group claimed to have captured 5 vehicles, burned 6, and captured at least one DShK machine gun (1 killed, unknown wounded).[39]
Ansar Dine established Shariah law in its territory in Timbuktu, banning alcohol, smoking, cemetery visits on Fridays, soccer and demanding that all women wear veils.[43] The militant group punished those in its occupied territory that did not follow strict Shariah law by whipping them. Youth protests erupted in July 2012 in Goundam, a city in the Timbuktu region, after Ansar Dine whipped a woman holding her child for not having her veil properly positioned.[44] At the same time, the group permitted Malian humanitarian groups to enter northern Mali, under the condition that Ansar Dine was in charge of the transfer and distribution of food and medicines.[45]
Most of Ansar Dine’s members were Tuaregs from Ghali’s Ifogha tribe and Berabiche Arabs from the Timbuktu area.
Ansar Dine’s ideology closely mirrored that of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which came to view Ansar Dine as its southern arm in Mali.[46] AQIM was also led by Ghali’s cousin, Hamada Ag Hama, strengthening the tie between the two groups.
After the 2012 coup in northern Mali, Ansar Dine worked with the MNLA, AQIM, and the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) to occupy the region.[47] As the MNLA seized new territory, Ansar Dine would enter the territory to help occupy it, but then take over leadership in order to install Shariah law. In April 2012, Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO ended their alliances with the MNLA, because the MNLA’s objective, to establish a secular and independent state in northern Mali, strongly contradicted their aims to create a united Malian state governed by Shariah law.[48] Ansar Dine purportedly sent 100 fighters to help MUJAO fight the MNLA in Gao, while it fought the MNLA in Timbuktu during the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu from June 26-27, 2012. In December 2012, Ansar Dine participated in talks with the government of Burkina Faso and the MNLA to cease hostilities; unfortunately, the talks were unsuccessful.[49]
In January 2013, Ansar Dine political chief Alghabass Ag Intalla split from the group to form the Islamic Movement for Azaward (MIA), a group purportedly composed solely of Malians. MIA claimed to seek negotiations as a way to peacefully end the Mali crisis.
Following the unrest in Mali, Amadou Kouffa, a mentee of Ghali, formed the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) as an affiliate to Ansar Dine for coordination of its operations in central and southern Mali. FLM gained international attention for its January 2015 violent attacks in central Mali In January 2015. The media attributed several attacks in 2015 to the FLM that Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for; however, it is unclear which group actually carried out the attacks.[50]
Ansar Dine joined with Al Mourabitoun, the FLM, and the Sahara branch of AQIM into the unified organization, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen on March 2, 2017.[51]
In 2013, various French and Malian government officials accused the Qatari government of providing material support to Ansar Dine and other militant groups in northern Mali. Qatari NGOs, including the Qatari branch of Red Crescent, were the only humanitarian organizations allowed into the region during militant rule.[52]
[1] "Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb." Australian National Security, May 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2015.
[2] Weiss, Caleb. "Ansar Dine claims string of attacks across Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 07 Nov. 2016. Web. 01 July 2018; "Ansar Dine claims attack on southern Malia town." Reuters, 08 Nov. 2016. Web. 01 July 2018.
[3] Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016; "Mali Crisis: Key Players." BBC News, 12 Mar. 2013. Web. 26 July 2016; Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016.
[4] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[5] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 July 2016; Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016.
[6] Butcher, Tim. "Iyad Ag Ghaly - Mali's Islamist Leader." BBC News, 17 July 2012. Web. 01 Aug. 2016.
[7] "Tuareg Rebels Driven out of Timbuktu." Al Jazeera, 29 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2016.
[8] Lambert, Michael, and Jason Warner. "Who Is Ansar Dine?" CNN, 14 Aug. 2012. Web. 29 July 2016.
[9] Palus, Nancy. "Northern Mali Residents Rise Up Against Islamists." Voice of America. Voice of America, 13 July 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[10] "Can the Jihadists Be Stopped?" The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 10 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 July 2016; "Negotiating Humanitarian Access in the North." IRIN. IRIN, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[11] "Mali Peace Talks: Tuareg and Islamist Leaders 'chatted, Cracked Jokes.'" The France 24 Observers. The France 24 Observers, 5 Dec. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[12] Gaffey, Conner. "Who Is Iyad Ag Ghaly, Mali's Veteran Jihadi?" Newsweek, 29 June 2016. Web. 01 Aug. 2016.
[13] Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016.
[14] "Mali’s Ansar Dine Islamists 'split and want talks. '" BBC News, 24 Jan. 2013. Web. 02 July 2018.
[15] Gaffey, Conner. "Who Is Iyad Ag Ghaly, Mali's Veteran Jihadi?" Newsweek, 29 June 2016. Web. 01 Aug. 2016.
[16] Weiss, Caleb. "Al Qaeda linked to more than 250 West African attacks in 2016 | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 07 Jan. 2017. Web. 01 July 2018.
[17] Weiss, Caleb. "Ansar Dine’s Branch in Southern Mali Releases First Video | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 18 May 2016. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[18] Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016; Jacinto, Leela. "Mali's Whisky-drinking Rebel Turned Islamist Chief." France 24, 12 June 2012. Web. 28 July 2016; Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016.
[19] Lloyd-George, William. "The Man Who Brought the Black Flag to Timbuktu." Foreign Policy, 12 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 July 2016.
[20] Weiss, Caleb. "Iyad Ag Ghaly Reportedly in the Kidal Region of Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 28 July 2016; "Mali jihadist groups announce they will merge: report." Reuters, 02 March 2017. Web. 01 July 2018.
[21] Lloyd-George, William. "The Man Who Brought the Black Flag to Timbuktu." Foreign Policy, 12 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 July 2016.
[22] Beaumont, Peter. "Mali’s splinter group says it’s ready for talks." The Guardian, 24 Jan. 2013. Web. 02 July 2018.
[23] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[24] Houttuin, Saska. "Mali: MNLA's Struggle for Azawad Continues." AllAfrica.com, 20 July 2012. Web. 1 Aug. 2016; ALLEMANDOU, Ségolène. "Is Qatar Fuelling the Crisis in North Mali?" France 24. France 24, 21 Jan. 2013. Web. 01 Aug. 2016; DeYoung, Karen. "United States Designates Ansar Dine a Foreign Terrorist Organization." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 21 Mar. 2013. Web. 01 Aug. 2016; Brisard, Jean-Charles. "Terrorism Financing in North Africa." American Center for Democracy, 28 Nov. 2013. Web.
[25] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016; Gaffey, Conner. "Who Is Iyad Ag Ghaly, Mali's Veteran Jihadi?" Newsweek, 29 June 2016. Web. 01 Aug. 2016; Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016; Gaffey, Conner. "Who Is Iyad Ag Ghaly, Mali's Veteran Jihadi?" Newsweek, 29 June 2016. Web. 01 Aug. 2016.
[26] Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016; "SEARCH RESULTS: Ansar Al-Dine." GTD Search Results, Dec. 2015. Web. 28 July 2016; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[27] Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016.
[28] "Can the Jihadists Be Stopped?" The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 10 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 July 2016; "Negotiating Humanitarian Access in the North." IRIN. IRIN, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[29] "Mali Peace Talks: Tuareg and Islamist Leaders 'chatted, Cracked Jokes.'" The France 24 Observers. The France 24 Observers, 5 Dec. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[30] Weiss, Caleb. "Iyad Ag Ghaly Reportedly in the Kidal Region of Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 28 July 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[31] Hirsch, Afua. "Mali rebels tighten grip on northern towns." The Guardian. 02 April 2012. Web. 01 July 2018.
[32] “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.” Australian National Security, May 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2015; "Terrorist Designations of Ansar Al-Dine." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 21 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 July 2016.
[33] "Tuareg Rebels Driven out of Timbuktu." Al Jazeera, 29 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2016.
[34] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[35] "Eleven Soldiers Killed in Mali in Terrorist Attack on Camp, Government Says." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 04 Aug. 2015. Web. 01 Aug. 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[36] Weiss, Caleb. "Al Qaeda Group Strikes in Northern Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 26 Dec. 2015. Web. 01 Aug. 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[37] "Mali Islamist group Ansar Dine claims attack on U.N. base." Reuters, 13 Feb. 2016. Web. 03 July 2018.
[38] "Refworld | Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Mali." Refworld. The UN Refugee Agency, 19 July 2017. Web. 01 July 2018.
[39] Weiss, Caleb. "Ansar Dine claims string of attacks across Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 07 Nov. 2016. Web. 01 July 2018; "Ansar Dine claims attack on southern Malia town." Reuters, 08 Nov. 2016. Web. 01 July 2018.
[40] "Terrorist Designations of Ansar Al-Dine." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 21 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 July 2016.
[41] "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 24 June 2016. Web.
[42] "Government bans three alleged terrorist groups." BBC Democracy Live, 2 April 2014. Web. 26 June 2018.
[43] Lambert, Michael, and Jason Warner. "Who Is Ansar Dine?" CNN, 14 Aug. 2012. Web. 29 July 2016.
[44] Palus, Nancy. "Northern Mali Residents Rise Up Against Islamists." Voice of America. Voice of America, 13 July 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[45] "Can the Jihadists Be Stopped?" The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 10 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 July 2016; "Negotiating Humanitarian Access in the North." IRIN. IRIN, 30 Apr. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[46] Weiss, Caleb. "Malian Al Qaeda Leader Threatens France in Audio Statement | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 1 Nov. 2015. Web. 27 July 2016; JACINTO, Leela. "Mali's Whisky-drinking Rebel Turned Islamist Chief." France 24, 12 June 2012. Web. 28 July 2016; Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016.
[47] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[48] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 July 2016; Sandner, Philipp. "Ansar Dine: Radical Islamists in Northern Mali | Africa | DW.COM | 18.12.2014." DW, 18 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 July 2016.
[49] "Mali Peace Talks: Tuareg and Islamist Leaders 'chatted, Cracked Jokes.'" The France 24 Observers. The France 24 Observers, 5 Dec. 2012. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[50] Weiss, Caleb. "Ansar Dine’s Branch in Southern Mali Releases First Video | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal. The Long War Journal, 18 May 2016. Web. 02 Aug. 2016.
[51] "Challenges in Countering Terrorism in Libya." UN Counter Terrorism Committee, Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Libya Sanctions Committee, 27 June 2017. Web. 26 June 2018.
[52] Allemandou, Segolene. "Is Qatar Fueling the Crisis in north Mali?" France 24. France 24, 23 Jan. 2013. Web. 01 July 2018.