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The ADF’s self-declared objective is to secure the independence of Cameroon’s anglophone regions and form a new state known as Ambazonia.[58] Activists originally preached nonviolence in 2016 and 2017, but that creed began to lose salience in the wake of the government’s brutal repression of the protest movement. As a result, the ADF and other groups adopted a doctrine of separatism through violence. The ADF explicitly denounces peaceful protest and civil disobedience as ineffective to protect the interests of Cameroon’s anglophone regions.[59] The organization’s more immediate goals include the protection of Cameroon’s English speakers from the government’s crackdown.[60]
Greatly outmatched in numbers, armaments, and supplies in its conflict with the Cameroonian government, the ADF has turned to an alternative source of strength: traditional practices of sorcery. ADF militants believe in a magic known as Odeshi, in which charms such as amulets and necklaces are held to possess protective powers. The charms are usually produced by traditional medicine men and healers and are designed to guard poorly armed ADF militants from the bullets of Cameroonian government forces.[61] Each charm is thought to produce a specific effect, such as invisibility of the wearer or the jamming of the opponent’s gun. In order for Odeshi to be effective, believers must follow a set of rules, such as fighting for a righteous cause or adopting a particular diet.[62] The ADF militants’ belief system also includes a potion known as juju, which is held to confer similar protection in combat.[63]
Although the ADF’s membership includes political activists, the group as a whole has not participated collectively in the political process of Cameroon; rather, it seeks to divorce itself from that process. In that respect, the ADF staged attacks in order to disrupt the October 2018 presidential election and prevent citizens in the anglophone regions of Cameroon from voting.[64] The ADF has also refused to cooperate with the Interim Government of Ambazonia, the self-proclaimed government of the Ambazonian state.
Disclaimer: It is necessary to distinguish the ADF’s targets and tactics from those of unorganized anglophone separatists and other militant organizations advocating for the independence of the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. The ADF is only one player in a complex and constantly evolving conflict. Many high-profile attacks and abductions featured in the news are demonstrably the work of other actors or cannot be attributed to the ADF with a high degree of certainty. For example, the well-publicized kidnappings of schoolchildren in November 2018 and February 2019, as well as the kidnapping of a school soccer team in March 2019, are believed to be the work of anglophone separatists but not necessarily the ADF.[65]
The ADF aims to erode the ability of the national francophone government to exercise authority in the Northwest and Southwest regions. Taking advantage of rural Cameroon’s lack of developed transportation infrastructure, the ADF seeks to expand its own control of territory and block Yaoundé from projecting power in the country’s anglophone areas (see geographic locations section above).[66]Indeed, in an interview with the Guardian, ADF leader Lucas Cho Ayaba declared that the group’s goal was “to make Ambazonia ungovernable. We must try to raise the cost of the occupation to higher than the profits they get here.”[67]
In pursuit of this objective, ADF militants have utilized tactics including kidnappings, attacks with firearms, and forced closures of francophone schools.[68] The ADF’s operations generally comprise guerilla-style attacks with hunting rifles, small guns (often locally produced), and knives.[69] Militants operate from bases hidden in the jungles and hills of rural western Cameroon, which allows them to execute attacks quickly and then disappear.[70] While the ADF’s most common targets include Cameroonian government officials, soldiers, and security personnel, the group is also known to target civilians, albet not as frequently.[71] For the first few months of its existence, the ADF appears to have refrained from attacks on civilians but began to do so in 2018.[72]The ADF’s code of conduct prohibits targeting “innocent civilians,” although this definition is unclear. In its targeting of civilians, the group is thought to aim its fire at those perceived to be acting counter to its mission, such as individuals supportive of the government.[73]
With much of its leadership living in exile in the U.S. or Europe, the ADF experiences difficulties in coordinating attacks and operations. The group’s activity within Cameroon often occurs on an ad-hoc or informal basis, based more on availability of members and vulnerability of targets than a longer-term strategic vision. Relations between different units of the ADF can thus be chaotic.[74] Most communication within the group occurs via encrypted messaging apps, although cell reception in the rural areas where the ADF operates is poor.[75]
The ADF frequently uses social media to galvanize support and accuse the government of overreach; these tactics have included disinformation campaigns. For example, militants and sympathizers have shared old videos of Cameroonian military abuses in the conflict against Boko Haram, claiming that they depicted recent atrocities directed against English speakers. In another case, a video of a house fire in the United States was falsely suggested to be an attack on an anglophone village.[76]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
Over its nearly two-year history, the ADF has a consistent pattern of rarely claiming attacks. The below attacks have all been formally claimed by the ADF or attributed to the group with a high degree of certainty.[77]
September 9, 2017: The Ambazonia Defense Forces claimed an attack on a military camp in Besongabang in the Southwest region of Cameroon (3 killed, 0 wounded).[78]
November 29, 2017: The ADF attacked Cameroonian government soldiers in the Manyu district of the Southwest region. One soldier was kidnapped; his fate remains unknown (4 killed, unknown wounded).[79]
December 18, 2017: Separatist militants attacked Cameroonian paramilitary soldiers in the city of Kembong in Manyu. They are also believed to have set several villages on fire. The ADF did not claim this attack, but local sources attributed it to the group (4 killed, 0 wounded).[80]
February 24, 2018: The ADF kidnapped Animbom Aaron Ankiambom, a delegate for social affairs for the Northwest region. On March 10, the ADF released a video demanding that the government prove that separatist leaders in its custody were still alive, or else Ankiambom would be killed. Ankiambom has not been seen alive since (1 possibly killed, unknown wounded).[81]
September 9, 2018: In an effort to disrupt Cameroon’s presidential election, ADF militants blockaded traffic and burned buses in Bamenda, the capital city of the Northwest Region (none killed, unknown wounded).[82]
November 13, 2018: The ADF attacked a government army truck in the city of Nkambe in northwest Cameroon (13 killed, unknown wounded).[83]
December 15, 2018: The Cameroonian government reported that the ADF and another anglophone separatist group, the Tigers, clashed violently over control of the environs of Batibo, a city in the Northwest region. This was the first, and to date, only, known fight between two anglophone separatist militant organizations (unknown killed, unknown wounded)[84]
April 1, 2019: The ADF is suspected to be responsible for an unclaimed attack on a security checkpoint at a market in Penda Mboko, a municipality in the francophone Littoral region. This attack came a week after the ADF declared that it would expand its operations into the French-speaking regions of Cameroon for the first time (0 killed, 3 wounded).[85]
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The Ambazonia Defense Forces is not designated as a terrorist organization by any countries or international organizations without a vested interest in Cameroon’s civil conflict. The government of Cameroon, perhaps unsurprisingly, has officially labeled all anglophone separatists as “terrorists.”[86]
The ADF appeals to grievances and anger over discrimination and the Cameroonian government to attract support from the local anglophone population.[87] Many of its fighters are young men who applied for jobs with the Cameroonian government, including the army, police, customs, and public health services. The applicants to these government positions underwent extensive entrance examinations known as concours before being rejected. Some of those rejected believed they were turned away for being English rather than French speakers. Facing a lack of profitable economic opportunities, these disaffected Cameroonians turn to the waiting arms of the ADF.[88] The group also recruits refugees fleeing violence and destruction in their home villages in Cameroon’s anglophone regions.[89] For these communities, the ADF offers an opportunity to regain dignity and fight back against perceived overreach and human rights abuses by the government of Cameroon.
Given its name, Ambazonia Defense Forces, the ADF takes pride in serving as a guarantor of security for Cameroon’s anglophone community. Lucas Cho Ayaba, leader of the ADF, reiterates this point in his frequent media interviews: “You kill our people, we will pursue you to the gates of hell.”[90]
The ADF presents itself as representing the interests of Cameroonian English speakers. As a result, Ayaba has mandated an extensive list of rules of engagement intended to keep community relations stable and positive. This code includes prohibitions on rape, theft, torture, and killing of innocent civilians. Exactly what constitutes an “innocent civilian,” and whether being a French speaker is disqualifying to meet this standard, is unclear. Local ADF commanders are responsible for responding to infractions.[91]
The ADF’s relations with communities are not seamless, however. Residents of Bamenda, a city in Cameroon’s Northwest region, report that the ADF has pressured locals to support its operations and responded violently to those who do not comply. Those who do not adhere to the ADF’s separatist mission are branded as traitors.[92]
Due to the constantly shifting situation on the ground in Cameroon, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the relationships between the ADF and other militant organizations in the area, especially given that many of these groups have existed for only a few months or years. Nevertheless, a general outline is attainable.
Although the ADF is the most active anglophone separatist militant group, it is not the only actor involved in the Ambazonia insurgency, which lacks a single clear leader.[93] The self-proclaimed Interim Government of Ambazonia is currently led Samuel Ikome Sako and has established a skeleton government in exile. While it claims to speak for Cameroon’s anglophone community, the AGC and ADF operate separately from it. The AGC originally formed in opposition to the Interim Government’s former stance against the use of violence to achieve independence. While the Interim Government now endorses the use of armed force against Yaoundé, the AGC continues to keep a distance from it.[94] The ADF’s use of kidnapping as a tactic triggered a major breach with the Interim Government when the self-proclaimed Ambazonian minister of communication, Chris Anu, publicly condemned Ayaba in April 2018 for the his group’s abduction and possible assassination of Cameroonian government official Animbom Aaron Ankiambom.[95]
About a half dozen militant organizations emerged in parallel with the ADF in 2017 and 2018, and several appear to have distinct targets and tactics. While the ADF has pursued military, government, and civilian targets alike, a group known as the Vipers has repeatedly burned government buildings, and another, the Manyu Tigers, generally targets military checkpoints.[96] A group called the Red Dragons is active in the Southwest region’s Lebialem region and claims to have shot down a government helicopter, although this assertion is contested.[97]
Several other separatist militant groups have joined a loose confederation, known as the Ambazonia Self-Defense Council (ASDC), in which the ADF does not take part. Founded by the self-declared Interim Government of Ambazonia in March 2018, the ASDC is comprised of the Ambazonia Restoration Army, led by Paxson Agbor; the Tigers of Ambazonia; the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SCDF), led by Nso Foncha Nkem; and the Manyu Ghost Warriors.[98] Analysts consider this conglomerate to be the largest anglophone separatist militant organization in Cameroon in terms of number of members, though the ADF is thought to be the most active.[99]
A second separatist militant organization operates under the name Southern Cameroons Defense Forces seems more likely than peer groups to cooperate with the ADF. Led by Ebenezer Akwanga, this group uses the abbreviation SOCADEF. While some observers consider Nkem and Akwanga’s groups to be the same one, they are in fact commanded by different individuals and act separately.[100] Akwanga attended the University of Buea with Lucas Cho Ayaba, leader of the ADF, in the 1990s; together, they founded a student group to advocate for Ambazonian independence through the use of force.[101] They continued this activism through years of exile until their present involvement in the Anglophone Crisis.[102] Despite Ayaba and Akwanga’s shared history, no currently available information substantiates a relationship between their groups. It is possible, though, that such a relationship may exist.
The ADF’s exact level of cooperation with other separatist groups is unclear. The Cameroonian government has reported that in December 2018, the ADF and Tigers battled over control of the areas around the city of Batibo in the Northwest region.[103] As of April 2019, this is the only recorded instance of intra-separatist fighting. Apart from the Tigers, the ADF does not seem to clash violently with peers, instead aiming its attacks at Cameroonian government forces. The ADF and the other separatist groups collectively share the same tactics and ultimate goal: the use of violence to achieve independence of Cameroon’s anglophone regions. Some analysts believe their leaders, who largely live in exile abroad, may coordinate to some degree.[104]
Despite shared interests, anglophone separatist groups in Cameroon have tried and failed to unify in the past. Leaders of militant organizations met several times in Nigeria throughout 2017 to examine the possibility of joining forces. Each, however, claimed popular support from Cameroon’s anglophone community and proved unwilling to cede power, ultimately preventing the organizations from unifying under a single banner.[105]
In late March 2019, representatives from several pro-anglophone civil society groups met in Washington, D.C. to pursue the creation of a united front.[106] The ADF did not participate.
Simultaneously with the Anglophone Crisis, the Cameroonian government is waging a conflict against the Islamist militant organization Boko Haram in the northern part of the country. There is no relationship between Boko Haram and the Ambazonian Defense Forces or any other anglophone separatist group.[107]
The ADF does not enjoy state sponsorship, but members of the global Cameroonian diaspora community reportedly provide the organization with support and resources.[108] Emigrants supply the ADF with funding, coordination, and publicity and outreach via social media.[109] The ADF’s financial director claims that the group received $50,000 from these sources between its founding in September 2017 and February 2018.[110] According to analysts, support for the anglophone independence movement online is largely driven by members of the diaspora, who actively share pro-separatist content impugning the francophone government.[111]
The ADF maintains a website on which it pursues crowdfunding in the model of Kickstarter in order to raise money for militants’ salaries, weapons, and other supplies. It accepts donations via Bitcoin, PayPal, and bank transfers. The ADF uses its own social media accounts, including YouTube and Twitter (as well as Facebook before it was banned from the platform), to publicize its fundraising attempts.[112]
It has been rumored that Nigeria has provided the ADF with support; however, the group’s leader, Lucas Cho Ayaba, has denied this claim.[113] In late 2018, Nigeria extradited nearly 50 leaders of the anglophone separatist movement to Cameroon, where they have since been imprisoned, raising questions about the veracity of conjectures concerning potential Nigerian sponsorship of the ADF.[114]
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[4] The section of British Cameroon that did not join with the new Republic elected to join the newly independent state of Nigeria, a former British colony.
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[40] Kuah, Benedict. “From the Desk of the Chairman of the Ambazonia Defense Council.” Cameroon Concord. 6 March 2019. Web. 19 March 2019. <http://cameroon-concord.com/boko-haram/from-the-desk-of-the-chairman-of-.... Ntap, Emmanuel Jules. “Le chef de la milice sécessionniste anglophone tué par l’armée camerounaise.” VOA Afrique. 21 Dec. 2018. Web. 19 March 2019. <https://www.voaafrique.com/a/le-chef-de-la-milice-s%C3%A9cessionniste-an....
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[49] Chothia, Farouk. “Cameroon's Anglophone crisis: Red Dragons and Tigers - the rebels fighting for independence.” BBC News. 4 Oct. 2018. Web. 15 April 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211>.
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