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Al Mulathamun Battalion

The Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) was a Salafi-Jihadist militant organization operating in the African Sahel region.

Key Statistics

2012 First Recorded Activity
2013 First Attack
2018 Profile Last Updated

Profile Contents

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Overview

Narrative of the Organization's History

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Organization

Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations

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Strategy

Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets and Tactics

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Major Attacks

First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks

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Interactions

Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences

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Maps

Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time

Contact

Send a message to the Mapping Militants team.

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Last updated June 2018

How to Cite

Mapping Militant Organizations. “Al Mulathamun Battalion.” Stanford University. Last modified June 2018. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-mulathamun-battalion
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Organizational Overview

Formed: December 2012

Disbanded: August 2013

First Attack: January 16, 2013: The AMB took control of a British Petroleum gas complex near the town of In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria and held Algerian and foreign workers hostage.[1] The crisis ended on January 19 when the Algerian military intervened. Those killed included 39 hostages and 29 attackers.[2]

Last Attack: June 1, 2013: The AMB and the MUJAO attacked a prison in Niamey, Niger using small arms. The militant groups claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for Niger’s military intervention in Mali, which had led to their retreat from the country in January (2 killed, 3 injured).[3]

 

Executive Summary

The Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), also known as the Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, was a Salafi-Jihadist militant organization that operated in the Sahel region of North-West Africa. The group was founded in December 2012 when Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his battalion broke away from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The AMB still swore allegiance to Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and claimed to act in AQ’s name; however, the group was never formally recognized by AQ. The AMB gained international notoriety for its large-scale attacks, including most famously its January 2013 attack on the In Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria that killed 69 civilians. Partially as a result of this attack, the U.S. Department of State designated the AMB as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2013. The AMB often coordinated attacks with the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). In August 2013, the AMB merged with MUJAO to form Al Mourabitoun.

 

Group Narrative

The Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), also known as the Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, was a Salafi-jihadist organization founded by jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar. [4] The group has its origins in Belmokhtar’s brigade in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). When Belmokhtar split from AQIM in December 2012, he took his followers, primarily Algerian and Mauritanian militants, with him to form an independent group.[5] For months prior to the split, Belmokhtar operated the group of militants that later became the AMB as a semi-autonomous battalion within AQIM. He announced the group’s formal split from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in an online video, claiming that the Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade was composed of the best fighters from his AQIM cell and would pursue the fight against Western interests, spread jihad, and establish Shariah law in North Africa.[6]

While a member of AQIM, Belmokhtar expanded operations from Algeria into northern Mali.  After the Malian military, led by the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), overthrew the government in March 2012, AQIM, the Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine took advantage of the security vacuum to invade and occupy northern Mali. Based on instructions from Saharan AQIM commanders and the head of Ansar Dine, Belmokhtar created an alliance with MUJAO, leading to a tripartite alliance between the groups.[7] By July 2012, the three organizations had displaced MNLA as guarantors of the region’s independence. This was because the MNLA’s objective, to establish a secular and independent state in northern Mali, strongly contradicted the tripartite alliance’s aims to create a united Malian state governed by Shariah law.[8] Belmokhtar and his semi-autonomous brigade, still technically a part of AQIM, purportedly provided crucial military assistance to MUJAO against the MNLA in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in June 2012.[9] Though Belmokhtar used his forces to help MUJAO fight the MNLA, he posted to jihadist websites on July 1, 2012 that he remained open to accommodating the MNLA.[10]

As he operated his battalion with more and more autonomy, Belmokhtar’s relationship with AQIM leadership became increasingly contentious reportedly due to disagreements over power allocation among leaders, execution of Belmokhtar’s kidnapping operations, financial gain strategies and the lack of non-Algerian leadership in AQIM.[11] In October 2012, AQIM leadership wrote Belmokhtar a letter accusing him of not answering his phone, missing important meetings and failing to carry out “spectacular” attacks on “crusader alliances,” despite his plentiful resources.[12] Although Belmokhtar organized attacks during his time in AQIM, he focused most of his efforts on his criminal enterprise: abduction of Westerners, trafficking of drugs, cigarettes, weapons, and humans across the Sahara Desert and money theft.[13]

In December 2012, Belmokhtar officially left AQIM, taking his followers, primarily Algerian and Mauritanian militants, with him to form a fully independent group known as the Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), or the Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade.[14] Belmokhtar announced the group’s formal split from AQIM in an online video, claiming that the AMB was composed of the best fighters from his AQIM cell and would pursue the fight against Western interests, spread jihad and establish Shariah law in North Africa.[15] Despite the split from AQIM, Belmokhtar maintained ties to Al Qaeda (AQ).[16] Whether Belmokhtar chose to leave or was expelled from AQIM remains unclear.

Following the French invasion of northern Mali in January 2013, which forced the tripartite militant alliance to flee to the northern mountains, the AMB continued to fight. The group did not gain notoriety, however, until it attacked Algeria and Niger in retaliation for the French intervention.  In its most well-known attack, on January 16, 2013, the AMB took control of a British Petroleum gas complex near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria, with reported logistical assistance from the Sons of the Islamic Sahara Movement for Justice.[17]  The militants held Algerian and foreign workers hostage and demanded the release of 100 Islamists captured in Mali and an end to French airstrikes in northern Mali. The AMB claimed responsibility for the attack and announced that the assault was in response to Algeria’s permitting France to use its airspace when launching attacks against the rebel forces in northern Mali, although later accounts indicated that planning for the raid had begun before French intervention.[18] Thirty-nine hostages were killed, most caught in cross fire, and 29 militants died in the raids.

The AMB continued to coordinate with MUJAO; in May 2013, the groups carried out simultaneous, coordinated suicide bombing attacks against a military camp in Agadez, Niger, and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, Niger.[19] After multiple coordinated attacks, on August 2013, Belmokhtar and the leaders of MUJAO announced that their two organizations would merge into a single group, Al Mourabitoun.[20] Following the merger, the media continued to attribute attacks in North Africa to the AMB; however, it is unclear if these attacks were actually carried out by Al Mourabitoun, or by militants formerly associated with the AMB.[21]



[1] "Al-Mulathamun Battalion." Jihad Intel, n.d.

[2] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding:  The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015) https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014). 

[3] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "Mali's Red Cross Fears for Missing Staff." BBC News, February 11, 2014; "Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped." The BBC News, June 2, 2013.

[4] For a history of these developments, see Mémier, Marc. “AQMI et Al-Mourabitoun: le djihad sahélien réunifié?”  Études de l’Ifri, Ifri, janvier 2017.  See also Chivvis, Christopher S. and Andrew Liepman, North Africa’s Menace:  AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response.  Santa Monica: Rand, 2013. 

[5] Black, Ian. "Mali Militants: Who's Who among Islamist Rebels." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 16, 2013.

[6] “Profile:  Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC News, June 15, 2015   https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480.  Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.

[7] Wojtanik, Andrew. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2015.

[8] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, April 2, 2012.

[9] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 5, 2013; Roggio, Bill. "US Adds MUJAO Operative to Terrorism List," Long War Journal, August 21, 2013; "In Mali, Islamists Oust Tuareg Rebels From Gao," VOA News, June 28, 2012.

[10] Ely Ould Maghlah, "Bellawar raconte sa version des affrontements de Gao et appelle au calme et à la concertation," Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 1, 2012.  

[11] Wojtanik, Andrew. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2015; Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2013.

[12] Hall, John. "'You Never Answer Your Phone, You Don't File Expenses and You Miss Important Meetings': International Terrorist Moktar Belmoktar Receives Dressing down from Al-Qa'ida Leadership in Newly Discovered Letter." The Independent. May 29, 2013; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014).  

[13] Chivvis, Christopher S. and Andrew Liepman. North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response.  RAND Corporation, 2013. Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015.

[14] Black, Ian. "Mali Militants: Who's Who among Islamist Rebels." The Guardian, January 16, 2013.   

[15] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm; "Those Who Sign With Blood / Masked Battalion / El-Moulethamine Battalion / Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya ("Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa," MUJWA / MUJAO)." Global Security, June 14, 2015.

[16] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.

[17] Armstrong, Hannah, “The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest,” CTC Sentinel, Africa Special Issue, Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2014 (https://CTC.USMA.edu/The-In-Amenas-Attack-In-The-Context-Of-Southern-Algerias-Growing-Social-Unrest/). 

[18] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding:  The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015). https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/

[19] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao," BBC News, August 22, 2013; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs," BBC News, May 24, 2013.

[20]  "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, August 22, 2013; Weiss, Caleb, "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers,” The Long War Journal, January 5, 2015.

[21] "Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population." Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2015; Weiss, Caleb. "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, January 5, 2015.

 

Organizational Structure

Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations

    Leadership
  • Leadership
  • Name Changes/Aliases
  • Size Estimates
  • Resources
  • Geographic Locations

Leadership

Mokhtar Belmokhtar (December 2012 to August 2013): Belmokhtar was the founder of the AMB and served as its main leader until the group’s merger with MUJAO in August 2013. Belmokhtar trained in Afghan Al Qaeda training camps in the 1990s; prior to founding the AMB, Belmokhtar fought in the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which later became AQIM.[1]  He was added to the United Nations Security Council Al Qaeda sanctions list on November 11, 2003, at which time the U.S. government offered a reward of up to $5 million for information on his location.[2] Belmokhtar split from AQIM in 2012 due to disagreements with other leaders and formed the AMB. The Libyan government claims that a U.S. airstrike killed Belmokhtar in Libya on June 14, 2015; however, given a lack of forensic evidence, Belmokhtar’s death has not yet been confirmed.[3]



[1] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013; Morgan, Andy. "Mr. Marlboro Lands a Seismic Blow." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, January 19, 2013.

[2] Although the United Nations designation gives the date as 2003 (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summari...), this must surely be 2013.  See the West Point Combatting Terrorism Center Jihadi Bios Project biography, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel,” 2015 (author Andrew Wojtanik,) https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/01/CTC_Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-2.pdf

[3] Schmitt, Eric. "U.S. Airstrike in Libya Targets Planner of 2013 Algeria Attack," The New York Times, June 14, 2015.

 

Name Changes/Aliases

There are no recorded name changes for this group. Aliases include Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade, Al-Muwaqi’un Bil Dima, Al Mulathamun, Al Mulathameen, al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, Masked Men Brigade, Signers in Blood Battalion, Signed in Blood Brigade, and Witnesses in Blood.

Size Estimates

There are no publicly available size estimates for this group.

Resources

The AMB was primarily financed by kidnapping for ransom, regional arms and drug trafficking operations masterminded by leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar.[1] Belmokhtar built lucrative smuggling routes throughout the Sahel in the early 2000s, made possible because of his family ties to the local tribes in Mali, allegedly formed through his marriages to four women from local Arab and Tuareg communities.[2]



[1]  Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm

[2] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar." BBC News, June 25, 2015.

 



[i] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm

[ii]Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar." BBC News, June 25, 2015. 

 

Geographic Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

While it was still operating as a semi-autonomous part of AQIM, the AMB was in charge of AQIM’s southern operations and operated out of Mali.  After the military coup that ousted the Malian government in March 2012, the AMB operated primarily out of northern Mali and helped MUJAO to hold Gao and its environs for a little under a year.  Following the French invasion that expelled militants from northern Mali in January 2013, the AMB staged attacks in Algeria and Niger.[1]



[1] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm

 

Strategy

Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics

    Ideology and Goals
  • Ideology and Goals
  • Political Activities
  • Targets and Tactics

Ideology and Goals

Despite its split from AQIM, the AMB claimed to remain loyal to the ideology and command of Al Qaeda Central.[1] The militant group aimed to spread jihad through all of the Sahara and impose Shariah law in North Africa. Belmokhtar encouraged his militants to fight against Western nations, both within the confines of Mali and outside of it; however, the groups’ attacks were mainly focused on Westerners and Western interests in North Africa.[2]



[1] Roggio, Bill, and Thomas Joscelyn. "Al Qaeda-linked Group Claims Credit for Kidnappings in Algeria,” The Long War Journal, January 16, 2013.

[2] "Those Who Sign With Blood / Masked Battalion / El-Moulethamine Battalion / Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya ("Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa," MUJWA / MUJAO)." Global Security, June 14, 2015.

 

Political Activities

There are no recorded political activities for this group.

Targets and Tactics

The AMB employed car bombings, suicide attacks, and kidnappings.  Its main targets included western civilian interests in North Africa, the French and Malian militaries, and anyone who aided the French military in its invasion of northern Mali, including the Nigerien and Algerian governments and militaries.[1]



[1] "How 'Mr Marlboro' Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Reign of Terror Struck Fear into the Heart of Mali." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, January 18, 2013.

 

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Major Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

January 16, 2013: AMB forces took control of a British Petroleum gas complex near the town of In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria and held Algerian and foreign workers hostage in retaliation for Algeria permitting France to use its airspace to launch attacks against the rebel forces in northern Mali.[1] The crisis ended on January 19 when the Algerian military intervened.  Those killed included 39 hostages and 29 attackers.[2]

May 23, 2013: The AMB and MUJAO carried out simultaneous, coordinated suicide bombing attacks against a military camp in Agadez, Niger and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, Niger (25 killed, 20 wounded).[3]

June 1, 2013: The AMB and MUJAO attacked a prison in Niamey, Niger with small arms, permitting 22 inmates to escape. The militant groups claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for Niger’s military intervention, which drove them out of northern Mali in January (2 killed, 3 wounded).[4]



[1] "Al-Mulathamun Battalion." Jihad Intel, n.d.

[2] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding:  The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015) https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014). 

[3] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, August 22, 2013; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs." BBC News, May 24, 2013.

[4] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "Mali's Red Cross Fears for Missing Staff." BBC News, February 11, 2014; "Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped." The BBC News, June 2, 2013.

 

Interactions

Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences

    Designated/ Listed
  • Designated/ Listed
  • Community Relations
  • Relationships with Other Groups
  • State Sponsors and External Influences

Designated/ Listed

  • U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO): December 18, 2013 to Present.[1]
  • UNSC ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List: June 2, 2014 to Present.[2]


[1] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, “Terrorist Designation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion,” December 18, 2013.  The Department of State considers the Those Who Sign in Blood group as a unit of the al-Mulathamun Battalion:  “Both the “Those Who Sign in Blood” battalion and “al-Murabitoun” are included in the designation as aliases of the al-Mulathamun Battalion, and, as a result, all consequences of these designations will also apply to them.”

[2] "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, June 24, 2016. https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=al-qaida#alqaedaent.  Further information provided by INTERPOL available at https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5794759.  

 

Community Relations

Mokhtar Belmokhtar maintained extensive and lucrative smuggling routes for drugs, weapons, and humans throughout the Sahel.  This was allegedly made possible because of his family ties to the local tribes in Mali, formed through his marriages to four different women from local Arab and Tuareg communities.[1] The 2013 In Amenas attack in Algeria was conducted in cooperation with a local group that grew out of protests by southern Algerian populations dissatisfied with the regime, extractive industries, and unemployment.[2]



[1] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar." BBC News, June 15, 2015.

[2] Armstrong, Hannah, “The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest,” CTC Sentinel, Africa Special Issue, Volume 7, Issue 2, February 2014 (https://CTC.USMA.edu/The-In-Amenas-Attack-In-The-Context-Of-Southern-Alg...).   

 

Relationships with Other Groups

The AMB formed in December 2012, when Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his soldiers split from AQIM. Although the groups split due to tensions in the leadership, it is unclear whether Belmokhtar chose to leave or was expelled.  Belmokhtar remained loyal to AQ and continued taking direction from AQ Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, although AQ did not recognize the AMB as an affiliate.[1]

Following the Malian coup of March 2012 and the consolidation of militant-held territory in northern Mali in June 2012, the AMB, as a semi-autonomous faction of AQIM, coordinated attacks with MUJAO and Ansar Dine against the MNLA.  Belmokhtar later posted to jihadist websites on July 1, 2012 that despite the attacks against the MNLA, he remained open to accommodating the group.[2] After the French invaded and expelled the militant groups in northern Mali in January 2013, the fully independent AMB and MUJAO coordinated attacks in Mali, Niger and Algeria.   In August 2013, the AMB merged with MUJAO into a new organization called Al Murabitoun.[3]



[1] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.

[2] Ely Ould Maghlah, “Bellawar raconte sa version des affrontements de Gao et appelle au calme et à la concertation,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 1, 2012.

[3] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao," BBC News, August 22, 2013; Mémier, 2017.  For background see also Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun,” April 7, 2015. 

 

State Sponsors and External Influences

There are no publicly available external influences for this group.

Maps

The project develops a series of interactive diagrams that “map” relationships among groups and show how those relationships change over time. The user can change map settings to display different features (e.g., leadership changes), adjust the time scale, and trace individual groups.