Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
Hamas Iraq was a nationalist, Sunni Islamist militant organization that sought to expel all foreign troops and influence from Iraq. The group held vehement anti-occupation, anti-American views, which ran counter to rumors that the group cooperated with U.S. forces to counter AQI.[17]
Hamas Iraq was relatively inclusive in its ideology and emphasized the need to work with Shiite organizations to exorcize foreign influence from Iraq. The group denounced indiscriminate violence and attacks that targeted civilians because of their ethnic or sectarian allegiances.[18]
Hamas Iraq’s relationship with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the largest Sunni political party in Iraq, was highly debated. While some sources claimed that Hamas Iraq was the armed branch of the IIP, others claimed that the two were merely associated. Still others asserted that there was no connection between Hamas Iraq and the IIP at all.[19]
In July 2007, Hamas Iraq joined with the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance and the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF) – composed of Ansar-al Sunnah Shariah, the Mujahideen Army, and the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) – to form a new umbrella group named the Political Council for Iraqi Resistance (PCIR).[20] The PCIR sought to drive foreign forces from Iraq and refused to cooperate with or acknowledge the legitimacy of any political institutions established under U.S. occupation.[21] In line with this rejection of U.S.-backed political institutions, the PCIR never formally participated in the Iraqi electoral system.
From 2007 to 2009 Hamas Iraq primarily targeted U.S. forces in Iraq.[22] In 2013, the group shifted to largely target the Iraqi government, although there is some speculation that Hamas Iraq was actually cooperating with the Iraqi Army to confront the Islamic State (IS).[23] Although Hamas Iraq decried sectarian violence on multiple occasions and criticized AQI for targeting Shiite civilians, the group occasionally attacked Shiite militias, claiming that they were legitimate targets because of their cooperation with the U.S.-backed Iraqi government.[24]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
April 10, 2007: Hamas Iraq used two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a U.S. military transportation vehicle in Diyala and subsequently posted a video of the attack online. (unknown killed, unknown wounded)[25]
2007: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the 1920s Revolution Brigades accused Hamas Iraq of fighting alongside the U.S. against AQI in Diyala. Hamas Iraq repudiated these claims. (unknown casualties)[26]
January 22, 2008: Hamas Iraq claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a U.S. military vehicle in Anbar. (unknown casualties)[27]
February 2009: Hamas Iraq orchestrated several grenade attacks against U.S. forces in Baqouba in the Diyala province. (unknown casualties)[28]
Hamas Iraq has not been designated as a foreign terrorism organization by the United States, European Union, or United Nations.
The relationship between Hamas Iraq and the communities in which it resides is unknown.
Prior to March 2007, Hamas Iraq was part of the 1920s Revolution Brigades (1920s RB). However, following the death of the leader of the 1920s RB and an AQI chlorine attack on a town near Fallujah, disagreement arose within the 1920s RB regarding how the organization should respond to these events.[29] While one faction wanted to directly confront AQI and possibly cooperate with the U.S.-backed Sons of Iraq, the other preferred to continue to oppose the U.S. and take a more passive approach to countering AQI. This latter faction broke away from the organization in March 2007 and became Hamas Iraq.[30] In late 2007, the 1920s RB accused Hamas Iraq of cooperating with the U.S. in Diyala. Hamas Iraq vehemently refuted this claim.[31]
In July 2007, Hamas Iraq joined with the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance and an the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF) – composed of Ansar-al Sunnah Shariah, the Mujahideen Army, and the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) – to form a new umbrella group called the Political Council for Iraqi Resistance (PCIR).[32] The PCIR sought to cooperate with other Shiite and Sunni anti-occupation groups in Iraq to establish a temporary technocratic government following the anticipated American withdrawal.[33] However, there was no indication that the PCIR ever actually engaged with other resistance organizations.
Hamas Iraq and AQI were hostile toward each other for much of Hamas Iraq’s history. Almost immediately upon its formation, Hamas Iraq denounced AQI’s use of indiscriminate violence and targeting of Shiite civilians.[34] AQI, in turn, accused Hamas Iraq of cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter AQI in Diyala in 2007 – an accusation rejected by Hamas Iraq.[35] However, Hamas Iraq’s relationship with AQI’s successor organization, the Islamic State (IS), is unclear. While some sources claim that Hamas Iraq fought alongside the Islamic State and its allies, others believed that Hamas Iraq cooperated with Iraqi government troops.[36]
Hamas Iraq was profoundly influenced by the presence of foreign forces in Iraq, namely those from the United States. Although these foreign forces were the group’s main targets, there were also allegations that Hamas Iraq actually cooperated with the United States in Diyala in 2007.[37] Hamas Iraq denied these claims.[38]
[1] "Twentieth Revolution Brigades and Hamas of Iraq Individually Claim Downing American Helicopters in Baghdad, Video of Bombing Troop Transporter." SITE Institute: SITE Publications - Twentieth Revolution Brigades and Hamas of Iraq Individually Claim Downing American Helicopters in Baghdad, Video of Bombing Troop Transporter. April 10, 2007. Accessed April 09, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20070928061304/http://siteinstitute.org/bin/....
[2] Tomkins, Richard. "Ba'athist comeback feared; Insurgent former Saddam loyalists seen causing violence." LexisNexis Academic, The Washington Times, 4 June 2009.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/04/baathist-comeback-feared/
[3] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Gabbay, Michael. “The 2008 Elections and Sunni Insurgent Dynamics in Iraq.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 15 Sept. 2008. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; “Hamas Iraq.” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, Date unknown. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Roggio, Bill, "Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda," The Long War Journal, 4 October 2007. Web. 10 July 2012.
[4] "Clans against al-Qa'ida." LexisNexis Academic, Mideast Mirror, 27 April 2007.
[5] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Roggio, Bill, "Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda," The Long War Journal, 4 October 2007. Web. 10 July 2012.; Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[6] Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
[7] Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[8] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug 2015.
[9] Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[10]Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.
[11] Tomkins, Richard. "Ba'athist comeback feared; Insurgent former Saddam loyalists seen causing violence." LexisNexis Academic, The Washington Times, 4 June 2009.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/04/baathist-comeback-feared/
[12] Berwani, Hawar. “25 Iraq’s Hamas Fighters join National Reconciliation Project in Diyala.” Iraqi News, 8 Sept. 2011. Web. 10 Aug 2015.;“Government tries to Disarm Diyala Sons of Iraq.” Musings on Iraq, 7 June 2010. Web. 10 Aug 2015.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug.; “Powerful Iraqi Party Claims U.S. Killed Innocent Man.” McClatchy DC, 25 Oct. 2008. Web. 10 Aug 2015.
[13] “Kurdistan Region-Iraq News in brief.” Ekurd Daily, 30 June 2006. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; “Resurgent Insurgency.” Assyrian International News Agency, 3 March 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Knights, Michael. “ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 29 May 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[14] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[15] Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[16] "Seven die in Baghdad bomb blast." BBC News, 30 October 2004. Web. 24 April 2010.; "Iraqi group claims attack on US soldiers in Baghdad." Al Jazeera via BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 30, 2005.; "Armed group videotape claims attack against US jeep in northern Iraq," LexisNexis Academic, Al-Jazeera via BBC Monitoring Middle East, 13 January 2006.; Tomkins, Richard. "Ba'athist comeback feared; Insurgent former Saddam loyalists seen causing violence." LexisNexis Academic, The Washington Times, 4 June 2009.; Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[17] Roggio, Bill, "Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda," The Long War Journal, 4 October 2007. Web. 10 July 2012; Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015; Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.
[18] Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[19] "The Death Industry." LexisNexis Academic, Al-Arabiya Television via BBC Monitoring Middle East, 11 June 2010.; "Iraqi Islamic Party." GlobalSecurity.org, 9 March 2010. 22 April 2011.; Gabbay, Michael. “The 2008 Elections and Sunni Insurgent Dynamics in Iraq.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 15 Sept. 2008. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[20] Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
[21] Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[22] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug.
[23] “Kurdistan Region-Iraq News in brief.” Ekurd Daily, 30 June 2006. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. “Resurgent Insurgency.” Assyrian International News Agency, 3 March 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. Knights, Michael. “ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 29 May 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[24] Gabbay, Michael. "Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq." CTC Sentinel 1(4), March 2008. Web. 15 October 2010.
[25] "Twentieth Revolution Brigades and Hamas of Iraq Individually Claim Downing American Helicopters in Baghdad, Video of Bombing Troop Transporter." SITE Institute: SITE Publications - Twentieth Revolution Brigades and Hamas of Iraq Individually Claim Downing American Helicopters in Baghdad, Video of Bombing Troop Transporter. April 10, 2007. Accessed April 09, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20070928061304/http://siteinstitute.org/bin/....
[26] Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[27] "Hamas-Iraq claims blowing up US vehicle with homemade rocket," LexisNexis Academic, Al-Jazeera (Qatar) via BBC Monitoring Middle East, 22 January 2008.
[28] Tomkins, Richard. "Ba'athist comeback feared; Insurgent former Saddam loyalists seen causing violence." LexisNexis Academic, The Washington Times, 4 June 2009.
[29] "Clans against al-Qa'ida." LexisNexis Academic, Mideast Mirror, 27 April 2007.; Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[30] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Roggio, Bill, "Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda," The Long War Journal, 4 October 2007. Web. 10 July 2012.; Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[31] “Kurdistan Region-Iraq News in brief.” Ekurd Daily, 30 June 2006. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. ; “Resurgent Insurgency.” Assyrian International News Agency, 3 March 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Knights, Michael. “ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 29 May 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[32] Bakier, Abdul Hameed. “Iraq’s Islamic Mujahideen Profiled by Jihadi Websites: Part Two.” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus 5(41), 3 December 2008. Web. 23 July 2015.
[33] Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[34] Khalil, Lydia. “Leader of the 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda.” Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Milne, Seumas. “Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout.” The Guardian, 19 July, 2007. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[35] Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[36] “Kurdistan Region-Iraq News in brief.” Ekurd Daily, 30 June 2006. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; “Resurgent Insurgency.” Assyrian International News Agency, 3 March 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.; Knights, Michael. “ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 29 May 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[37] Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.; Ali, Abdallah Suleiman. “ISIS prefers allegiance, not allies, in Iraq.” Al Monitor, 17 June 2014. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[38] Angell, Ami & Gunaratna, Rohan. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq.” CRC Press: 2012.