These chapters both complement and expand on the work of Kapur (2007), who focuses on the Indo-Pakistan conventional crises that have been enabled by Pakistan's creeping nuclear umbrella. They do so, in part, by discussing the antecedent conditions for Pakistan's ability to expand the militant groups in terms of number, operational scope, and geographical area of operations as well as the contemporary Islamist militant landscape and the relationship that the state enjoys with the various actors therein.

Chapter 10 begins by asking which, if any, elements of this strategic culture could evolve over any policy-relevant future. It considers the various empirically demonstrated sources of change within the army and concludes with a discussion of the implications of these changes for the future of the institution and, by extension, the stability of Pakistan and of the region. This chapter also describes the geographical recruitment base of the army and how it has expanded from several districts in northern Punjab to include many districts in militancy-afflicted Southern Punjab, much of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Sindh, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and even parts of Balochistan (Fair and Nawaz 2011).

The final chapter revisits the framework laid out in Chapter 2 of this volume and identifies the implications for Pakistan's behavior over the near term. It argues that Pakistan is a "greedy state" in the parlance of Glaser. Thus, policies of appeasement (e.g., helping to secure a resolution of Kashmir) may encourage further Pakistani revisionist pursuits rather than vitiate them. This chapter concludes with the ominous suggestion that the world must be ready for a Pakistan that is willing to take ever more dangerous risks because, in the view of the Pakistan Army, it has everything to lose by not doing so. For the army, to be defeated is not to lose on the battlefield; rather, defeat is to forego the opportunity or ability to keep resisting India and the agenda that Pakistan ascribes to its eastern nemesis.

CHAPTER 2

Can Strategic Culture Explain the Pakistan Army's Persistent Revisionism?

In this chapter, I first lay out the characteristics of Pakistan's persistent and even expanding revisionist goals. Next, I present a framework of Pakistan's domestic politics derived from the work of Zonts (2006) to help explain how both military regimes and civilian governments alike pursue the army's revisionist agenda. Third, I briefly recount some of the salient debates in the scholarly literature about strategic culture and exposit how I apply Johnston's (1995a, 1995b) formulation of strategic culture to the Pakistan Army. Fourth, I offer a justification for reducing this puzzle of Pakistan's strategic culture generally to that of the army in particular. Then I give an overview of the Pakistan Army, this is fundamental to understanding how the strategic culture of the army is reproduced and sustained. I conclude with a brief discussion of methods and sources I use in this effort.

Pakistan's Enduring and Expanding Revisionism

Pakistan is revisionist, or anti-status quo, in that it desires to bring all of the disputed territory of Kashmir under its control, including the portion currently governed by India. As I describe in Chapter 3, while Kashmir never belonged to Pakistan in any legal sense, acquiring it is integral to Pakistan's national identity. Pakistan is revisionist in another sense in that it seeks to actively thwart India's rise in the region and beyond. Pakistan insists that India and the rest of the world view and treat it as India's equal. Resisting India's rise is both an ideological and ideological goal of the Pakistan Army; however, doing so also has implications for how the army uses instruments of force and other elements of national power. For example, recent Pakistani reliance on Islamist militants in Afghanistan such as the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and even Lashkar-e-Taiba has as much to do with limiting India's presence there as it does with shaping a regime in Kabul that is friendly to Pakistan. In contrast to Pakistan, India is territorially
satisfied with the status quo, but it is mildly revisionist with respect to its place in the international system (Mohan 2004, 2006).

Pakistan first tried to seize Kashmir in 1947. As British decolonization of South Asia loomed, the sovereign of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, hoped to keep the country independent of either of the two new states, India or Pakistan. As Singh held out, marauders from Pakistan's tribal areas invaded the territory of Jammu-Kashmir in hopes of taking it for Pakistan and were supported extensively by Pakistan's nascent provincial and federal governments. This attack expanded into the first war between India and Pakistan. When it was over and the cease-fire line was drawn, Pakistan controlled about one-third of Kashmir, and India controlled the remainder. Although the war ended in a stalemate with international intervention, Pakistan may have rightly concluded that the strategy of using irregular fighters succeeded. After all, Pakistan had claimed at least some part of Kashmir, which it would not have had otherwise. Moreover, because of the war, Kashmir was the subject of several United Nations Security Council resolutions, and it was recognized as a "disputed territory" rather than a territory over which India exercised incontestable sovereignty.

Since 1947, Pakistan has remained locked in an enduring rivalry with India and has been steadfastly committed to seizing control of the entire territory of Jammu-Kashmir. After the first war, Pakistan maintained a low-level proxy war in Kashmir in hopes of making India's possession of the territory so costly that India would simply abandon it altogether (Swami 2007). By the late 1950s, articles in Pakistan's professional military publications were already arguing for the viability of initiating and sustaining guerrilla operations within the implied theater of Indian-controlled Kashmir.

Pakistan's second major military attempt to change the territorial status quo took place in 1965, when Pakistan dispatched regular and irregular troops disguised as local fighters to Indian-administered Kashmir in hopes of igniting an insurgency there and of bringing international attention to the dispute. No uprising materialized, but the misadventure did slide into the second Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir when India opened a second front across the international border. Indian and Pakistani accounts of their own performance diverge with respect to their losses of men and territory and the losses they inflicted upon the other (Nawaz 2008a). Scholarly accounts maintain that the war ended in what appeared to be a stalemate. However, there is strong evidence that India could have continued the war to deliver a decisive defeat to Pakistan had poor civil–military coordination not led India to accept the UN ceasefire prematurely (Kaghan 2009).

The war ended in a draw, but scholars note that Pakistan fared worse than India. For one thing, the war resulted in a cessation of American aid to both combatants. Pakistan was more dependent on American assistance than was India and thus was more adversely affected. Second, India "achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force," whereas Pakistan "gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated" (Kux 1992, 238). When the war ended, it was obvious that India was in a position to severely damage, if not capture, Lahore in Pakistan's Punjab, which "lay virtually defenseless" (Wolpert 1993, 375). In addition, India also controlled the strategically important Uri-Poonch bulge in Kashmir (Wolpert 1993). Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed's account of the 1965 war, which General Headquarters approved for publication in 2002, describes it as a "watershed in the military history of the subcontinent. It marked the turning point in the balance of power in South Asia. After 1965, the Indian military power grew by leaps and bounds while Pakistan's strength declined appreciably" (530). This was, in his view, Pakistan's last opportunity to resolve the Kashmir dispute through military force in the twentieth century.

The 1965 war brought particular shame to the Pakistan Army in part because many Pakistanis were under the belief that their country was winning the war due to the misinformation broadcasted on Pakistan media throughout the conflict. During this war, Pakistan was under Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan's military rule. Consequently, "once the euphoria produced by the official propaganda during the war had died down in Pakistan, people realized that Ayub Khan and the military leadership had failed the nation militarily" (Nawaz 2008a, 239–240).

In 1971 the third war between Pakistan and India began, but unlike the previous two conflicts, which were fought over Kashmir and in which Pakistan was the obvious aggressor, this one began as a civil war in East Pakistan. Pakistan's Bengali citizens there, frustrated with West Pakistan's extractive policies and unable to achieve full citizenship within a united Pakistan, eventually chose to secede. As refugees flowed into India, India seized the opportunity to intervene. When the war was over, Pakistan had lost East Pakistan, which emerged as independent Bangladesh. Pakistan's army was disgraced because it lost the war along with half of the country's territory and population, but also because the country was under military governance when the war took place. While Pakistan and India were relatively quiescent in the years following that war, Pakistan did not acquiesce to India's rise. Pakistan's "determination to protect its national identity and policy autonomy did not decline after the 1971 military debacle at the hands of India. If anything, its disposition stiffened" (Rizvi 2002, 314). Pakistan emerged committed to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability to steadfastly resist Indian hegemony.

In spring 1999, Pakistan again sought to change maps in Kashmir through military force, less than a year after Pakistan and India became overt nuclear states. In that conflict, known as the Kargil War, Pakistan dispatched Northern Light Infantry paramilitary personnel along with regular Pakistani Army personnel to seize territory in the Kargil–Dras sectors of Indian-administered Kashmir. By the end of summer 1999, India had vanquished the Pakistani intruders, albeit at a high cost in personnel and after introducing air power into the conflict. Pakistan emerged from this crisis as a reckless, conflict-prone, nuclear-weapon
state. The army in particular fared poorly because its chief, Musharraf, did not fully inform Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about the operation and its implications. Instead, he undertook planning for the operation because Sharif was prosecuting an important diplomatic effort with India's prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In contrast, India received accolades for its forbearance and measured response to the outrageous maneuver. The Kargil War occasioned an important American shift away from Pakistan toward India and eventually paved the way for the US–India strategic partnership that unfolded during the tenures of US president George W. Bush and Indian prime minister Vajpayee (Fair 2009b; Lavoy 2009; Tellis et al. 2001).

Contrary to popular belief, Pakistan's efforts to antagonize India between official wars were not always restricted to fanning Islamist insurgency and terrorism. In the mid-1950s, Pakistan (as well as China) supported India's Naga rebels in northeast India through its own infrastructure in East Pakistan (Shekatkar 2009). In the 1960s Pakistan supported the Mizo rebels (Chadha 2009), also in India's northeast. Support to insurgents there became more difficult after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Beginning in the late 1970s and through the early 1990s, Pakistan supported the Sikh insurgency in India's northern state of Punjab (Fair 2004a, 2004c). By the mid-1980s, Pakistan's creeping nuclear umbrella emboldened it to pursue revisionist agendas. In the late 1980s, Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir began to rebel against New Delhi for a range of excesses including appalling electoral manipulation and its malfeasance in managing Kashmiri political expectations. While the rebellion began indigenously, Pakistan quickly exploited these developments. Pakistan redeployed battle-hardened militants from the waning Afghan war to Kashmir. By 1990, Pakistan and India were already behaving as if the other had an existential nuclear deterrent (Fair 2011b; Kapur 2007). Within a few years, Pakistan transformed a conflict that began as an indigenous uprising in the late 1980s into a sustained campaign of proxy war in Kashmir (Evans 2000; Ganguly 1997).

As Pakistan continued to expand its nuclear program, and thus its confidence that India would be deterred from taking punitive action, it also increased its reliance on militant proxies in India (Tellis et al. 2001). Following the overt nuclearization of the subcontinent in 1998, Pakistan became increasingly aggressive in its use of low-intensity conflict, employing both official military forces (i.e., the Kargil War) and Islamist militant proxies. Pakistan-backed Islamist militants have conducted dozens of attacks throughout India, the most significant of which were the December 2000 attack on an intelligence operations center located near New Delhi's Red Fort; the December 2001 strike on the Indian Parliament, which brought the two countries to the brink of war; the May 2002 attack on housing for families of Indian army personnel at Kaluchak in Kashmir; a July 2006 coordinated bomb attack on Mumbai's commuter rail system; and the November 2008 notorious multiday siege of several sites across Mumbai. (The terrorist group

Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for most of these incidents, with the exception of the 2001 Parliament attack, which was carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed. The 2006 attack was carried out by the Indian mujahideen with support from Lashkar-e-Taiba). These major assaults are in addition to many other smaller ones throughout India, which had fewer international and domestic consequences (Clarke 2010; Swarn 2008). By expanding the conflict to the Indian heartland, Pakistan hoped to increase the cost of India's adamant commitment to the territorial status quo in Kashmir.

Despite the claims of some analysts (e.g. Rubin and Rashid 2008), Pakistan's antagonism with respect to India cannot be reduced to the bilateral dispute over Kashmir. As I show throughout this volume, Pakistan's defense literature clearly maintains that Pakistan's army also aims to resist India's position of regional dominance and its slow but steady global ascent, and more often than not this threat from India is described in ideological and civilization terms rather than those of security (Mohan 2004, 2006; Pant 2009a, 2009b; Scott 2009). Recently, Brigadier Umar Farooq Durrani (2010, 1) summarized Pakistan's resilience against India's "superiority complex" and refusal to deal with Pakistan "on an equal footing" by noting that some 60 years after independence, "Pakistan's lasting defiant posture has kept the Indian-dream [sic] from becoming a reality" and that Pakistan's nuclear program has made India only "more bitter and hostile." His essay opened the 2010 Pakistan Army Green Book, which is issued every two years by the army's Training and Evaluation Command and which bears the imprimatur of the army chief himself.

The army's revisionist goals endure despite the accumulation of evidence that Pakistan's army cannot achieve them at present and is even less likely to succeed in the future. This is true for a number of reasons. For one, India's economic growth since the 1990s has allowed it to undertake significant defense modernization while keeping defense expenditures well below 3 percent of its gross domestic product (World Bank 2012). Second, India has forged strategic partnerships with the United States, Israel, Iran, and other regional and global actors and has even staged limited military exercises with China. Third, India's position in the international community is ascendant, with countries like the United States, Britain, and France formally backing its bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) within the context of UNSC reform (Thakur 2011).

In contrast, Pakistan's economy is shambolic, exhibiting weakness on virtually all measures (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). The country has long been dependent on bilateral and multilateral development partners (Wahab and Ahmed 2011). Pakistan's heavy investment in the armed forces since 1947 has crowded out investments in other areas. According to the World Bank (2006, 1–2), "Due to regional tensions, military expenditures in Pakistan have consistently absorbed a significant proportion of the budget (about one-quarter to one-third of total revenue).... There remained very little fiscal space for basic
government expenditures, or development expenditures," Shahid Javed Burki, a renowned Pakistani economist, argues that not only have Pakistan's priorities affected its spending decisions but also its security competition with India has resulted in enormous opportunity costs. In 2007, Burki calculated that had Pakistan not pursued revisionism in Kashmir,

[its] long-term growth rate could have been some 2.25 to 3.2 percentage points higher than that actually achieved... A growth rate of this magnitude sustained over half a century would have increased the country's gross product by a factor of between 3.4 and 4.4. Indeed, had the country been at peace with India over the past decades, Pakistan's 2003–2004 GDP could have been three and a half times larger than it was—$330 billion rather than $95 billion—and its income per capita could have been $2,200 rather than $630 (25).

Pakistan's revisionist agenda not only has posed heavy costs upon the state but also in recent years has directly affected the security of Pakistan's citizens and even the state's own stability. Current members and direct descendants of many of the militant groups spawned by Pakistan's intelligence agencies now target Pakistan's civilian, military, and intelligence institutions as well as its citizens (Fair 2011b; Hussain 2010; Swami 2007). Assessments of the number of such incidents and of their victims vary between several thousands and several tens of thousands (Global Terrorism Database 2012; Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies 2012).

In short, Pakistan has doggedly attempted to revise the geographical status quo and roll back India's ascendancy, and the very instruments it has used to attain these policies have undermined Pakistan's standing within the international community and even its own long-term viability. Looking to the future, Pakistan is even less likely to succeed either in altering the geographical status quo or in retarding India's ascent to regional and global power—yet it will continue to try to do so.

Pakistan should have abandoned its revisionism long ago. After all, scholars expect that "good strategy will... ensure that objectives are attained while poor strategy will lead to the ineffective execution of a state's power.... It is also assumed that strategies that fail to attain a state's objectives will, in all probability, evolve or be abandoned" (Glenn 2009, 533). Despite numerous and ever-expanding obstacles, Pakistan remains staunchly revisionist, even though its position, already untenable and destabilizing, will become increasingly so in the future. Given India's upward trajectory and Pakistan's ever-sinking position in the global system, game rationality suggests that it would behoove Pakistan to come to some accommodation with India today, as conceding defeat now will be less costly than doing so later, when the power differential between the two states is even greater.

Explaining Persistent Revisionism

The likelihood that Pakistan's military or even civilian leadership will abandon the state's long-standing and expanding revisionist goals and prosecute a policy of normalization with India is virtually nil. Even the 1971 catastrophic military defeat did not force Pakistan to revise its policies with regards to India. Pakistan's persistent revisionism can be situated within the more general scholarly puzzle as to why states are revisionist. Despite the challenges that revisionist states pose to international security, relatively few scholars have sought to explain why states remain revisionist, especially when such efforts consistently fail and even undermine the prospects for a state's very survival.4

Zionts (2006) sought to explain why some states refuse to abandon their revisionism in the face of clear policy failure. He does not deal with the question of why states are revisionist in the first place but rather seeks to understand a state's decision to persist with or abandon its revisionist goals. To do so, he posits domestic political structures as the crucial mediating variable. Zionts examines several revisionist states and defines them as either unreasonably or reasonably revisionist. This judgment is based not on a normative evaluation of the goal pursued or contingent upon the success or failure of the goal, but rather on the feasibility of achieving that goal given a cost constraint. According to Zionts, the sine qua non of an unreasonably revisionist state is that the state fails to moderate its policies despite decisive defeats, even when the state's survival is at stake (634).10

Zionts (2006) cites Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan, both of which pursued their revisionism until they were destroyed. These states exemplify suicidally revisionist states, an extreme form of unreasonable revisionism that resulted in the regimes' demise. He describes Iran's actions during the Iran–Iraq war as those of a nonsuicidal but still unreasonably revisionist state. Despite Iraq's initial victories, Iran managed to repel Iraqi troops from its territory. When Saddam Hussein realized that he could not swiftly defeat his adversary, he pressed for peace and in June 1982 offered a ceasefire. Iran not only refused the offer but also actually attacked Iraq as part of its own effort to secure regime change. Despite severe casualties and economic hardship, Iran persisted in this policy for almost a decade. What made Iran's revisionism unreasonable, in Zionts' terminology, was its refusal to moderate its goals even though its assumptions proved time and time again to be false. Ayatollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire only when he became convinced that failure to do so would mean the end of his Islamic revolution and of the Islamic Republic. But as unreasonable as Iran's revisionism was with respect to regime change in Iraq, it eventually relented. Pakistan, in contrast, has never moderated its revisionism since 1947.

Zionts (2006) distinguishes unreasonable states from those that are reasonably revisionist. States in this latter category drop their revisionist pursuits after having concluded that, given the low likelihood that they will prevail, the
probable benefits of their revisionist activities are less than the probable costs. For Zionists, the actions of Israel during the 1982 war in Lebanon provide an example of reasonable revisionism. Israel invaded with the goal of destroying the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), ejecting it from Lebanon and installing a Maronite Christian-dominated leadership that would be positively disposed toward Israel. Israel succeeded in pressuring Lebanon to install Bashir Gemayel, an ally of the Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, as president in August 1982. Gemayel, however, was assassinated the following month. In response, Israel scaled back its goals in Lebanon, ceasing to seek an explicitly pro-Israeli government there. Note that Zionists do not frame Israel’s revisionism within the larger context of its dispute with Palestinians or with other Arab states, and he does not use revisionism in the narrower sense of territorial revisionism but instead uses political revisionism.

Zionists (2006) argues that there are four variables (domestic structures, domestic politics, and elite ideology), “mediated by the structure of incentives and constraints” (639) facing leaders, explain the persistence of unreasonable revisionism. In terms of domestic political structures, Zionists distinguishes between democratic and autocratic states. In those that are democratic, the public’s views will influence policymakers’ decision to alter or sustain the state’s foreign policy, if for no other reason than the need for democratic leaders to deliver popular policies or face defeat through democratic competition. In a closed system, however, the ideology of autocratic leaders will determine whether a state is reasonably or unreasonably revisionist. If leaders are ideological, they are likely to pursue a course of unreasonable revisionism, while pragmatic leaders are less likely to do so. This dynamic is captured in Figure 2.1.

The conceptualization Zionists (2006) presents ideal types of domestic political structures and of their role in producing unreasonable revisionism offers some promise for explaining Pakistan’s persistent commitment to reversing the status quo. Pakistan has been governed directly by the military for much of its history: from 1958 to 1969 by Ayub; from 1969 to 1971 by Gen. Yahya Khan; from 1977 to 1988 by Gen. Zia ul Haq; and from 1999 to 2007 by Musharraf.10 Even when not directly governing Pakistan, the army has wielded enormous influence over the country’s domestic politics and has dictated its foreign policies. Thus, even during periods of relative democracy, Pakistan still suffers under the weight of persistent praetorianism (Cohen 2004; Haqqani 2005; Jalal 1990; Siddiqua 2007). As recently as July 2013, the official commission established by the Pakistan government to investigate the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s safe haven in Pakistan concluded that, while constitutionally setting defense policy is the responsibility of the civilian government, “in reality…defense policy in Pakistan is considered the responsibility of the military and not the civilian government even if the civilian government goes through the motions of providing inputs into a policy making process from which it is essentially excluded” (Report

of the Abbottabad Commission 2013, 159). Over the expanse of its history, Pakistan—under military or even democratic governance—has distinct autocratic features.

Pakistan’s military, specifically the army, has long justified its dominant role in running the state by arguing that it is uniquely well positioned to protect not just Pakistan’s territorial integrity but also the very ideology of Pakistan, which centers on protecting Pakistan’s Muslim identity from India’s supposed Hindu identity (Haqani 2005; Fande 2011). Oddly, civilians seem to have thoroughly acquiesced to this reality. The Report of the Abbottabad Commission (2013) observed that the civilian government did not evidence the slightest interest in exerting control over the nation’s defense policy and further quipped that the minister of defense did not object to being “an irrelevance” (227).

For a number of reasons, Zionists (2006) model ultimately cannot resolve the Pakistan puzzle in entirety. First, he looks at the decision to revise or sustain a policy within the context of a single conflict (the Iran-Iraq War, or Israel’s efforts to install a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon). Compared with Pakistan’s 65-year history of initiating clashes with India, both of these episodes are relatively brief. In neither case does Zionists examine a state that persists in its revisionist goals for more than one decade. The Indo-Pakistan security competition has persisted for well over six decades despite the fact that Pakistan has either lost outright or failed to defeat India in every war they have fought. And unlike Zionists’ case-study subjects, since independence Pakistan has actually expanded its revisionist goals.
beyond the territorial dispute over Kashmir to include resisting what it sees as Indian hegemony.

Second, Zionts (2006) does not define elite ideology. Nor does he attempt to account for how it is created; how it comes to control; the views of others, less important, elites, or even how it shapes the views of the general public. (For Zionts, ideology is merely an intervening variable, one that he suggests explains the relationship between political structures and a state’s decision to jettison or embrace its revisionist goals. For this reason he does not dilute upon this concept of ideology.) It is important to understand these processes because states like Pakistan vacillate between autocracy and weak democracy. Part of the Pakistan Army’s ability to defend its preeminent position within the state stems from the success of its ideology, which permeates Pakistan’s varied institutions and societal groups. Even during the periods of (invariably weak) democracy, civilian leaders and citizens alike embrace the elite ideology of the military: its strategic culture. It is entirely possible that civilians lack the adequate will or motivation to challenge the army rather than simply embracing its strategic outlook and assessments. However, it is impossible to disambiguate coercion and acquiescence on one hand from complicity and agreement on the other. Crucially, even if civilian elites were able to change the country’s defense policy, it is unlikely they would do so because the military’s defense policy is in line with popular preferences and because the army can simply oust the elected government as it has done repeatedly.

In this effort, I modify Zionts’ (2006) framework to help explain Pakistan’s persistent revisionism in several important ways (Figure 2.2). First, rather than retaining his language of reasonable or unreasonable revisionism as outcomes, I simply use persists in revisionism or abandons revisionism as the possible outcomes of state behavior. This language is preferable because it avoids any normative connotation suggested by Zionts’ terminology. Second, I replace the army’s elite ideology with strategic culture. Third, because there has yet to be a government that is genuinely controlled through constitutionally elected representatives and that sets domestic and foreign policies, I further modify Zionts’ illustration to reflect the Pakistani reality of army-controlled democracy as the alternative regime type to military rule. Under periods of direct army rule, the ideological strategic culture of the Pakistan Army results in persistent revisionism. Zionts’ alternative pathway of a pragmatic elite ideology is not germane to the Pakistan case. When Pakistan is under a notionally civilian governance regime, the army’s preferences dominate in one or two ways. The civilian elites may share the strategic commitments of the army and thus continue the same policies as the army did when in power. Alternatively, if the civilians reject the army’s strategic understanding and concomitant preferences, they may not wish to overturn the army’s preferences for the purposes of staying in power. The outcomes are the same: revisionism persists. It is impossible to discern whether civilians pursue the army’s preferred policies out of fear of the army, embrace of its strategic culture, or both.

When civilians have reversed course on the army’s preferred policies, the army has ousted them and has resumed its preferred suite of policies. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin (1994) provides an account of this from 1971. Even though the Bengali and East Pakistan—born politician Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his party the Awami League swept the 1970 polls, the army refused to let him form the government. Twelve senior generals protested that if Mujib were in power he “would adopt a conciliatory attitude towards India, relegate Kashmir to the back-burner and direct funds from defence to economic development of East Pakistan” (156). The army’s decision to disregard the results of Pakistan’s general elections brought the country to the 1971 civil war in which India ultimately intervened to liberate East Pakistan. In 1988, Zia’s prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo signed the Geneva Accords to end hostilities in Afghanistan despite Zia’s opposition to the terms of the agreement. As soon as Zia received the last tranche of US assistance, he sacked the government. In 1998, Prime Minister Sharif embarked on a major diplomatic overture to normalize relations with India. While Musharruf did not take over the government at that time, he simply undermined the peace initiative by planning what would become the spring 1999 Kargil War. When Sharif tried to rid himself of Musharraf in October 1999, Musharraf seized power. Either through cooptation or coercion, the preferences produced by the army’s strategic culture dominate even during periods of civilian governance.
Strategic Culture Wars

Since the start of World War II, several waves of cultural theorists have argued for the importance of phenomena derived from historical or other ideational considerations to understand how states behave. As Alastair Johnston (1995b, 33) notes, much of this scholarship is consistent with the conclusions of Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn Jones (1988), who argue that the strategic studies literature tends to be ethnocentrically American and that it demonstrates a concomitant neglect of other "national styles of strategy." Proponents of cultural explanations for state behavior contend that states facing otherwise similar conditions will adopt varying strategic preferences depending on their formative experiences. These strategic preferences are therefore influenced to varying degrees by cultural, political, philosophical, and even cognitive characteristics of the states' elites, if not the citizenry from which these elites emerge (Johnston 1995b; Desch 1998).

International relations scholars continue to debate the role culture plays in international politics (see, e.g., Chaudhuri 2009; Desch 1998; Duffield et al. 1999). Its proponents value the concept because they believe it helps explain the choices that states make to secure their national security objectives and may even inform how these objectives are formulated in the first place. While many scholars have deployed the concept to inform their empirical analyses, the intellectual underpinnings of "strategic culture" remain contestable (see, e.g., Basrur 2001; Booth 1979; Chaudhuri 2009; Desch 1998; Farrell 2002; Foster 1992; Glenn 2009; Gray 1999; Johnston 1996, 1995a, 1995b; Kier 1995; Lantis and Charlton 2011; Lock 2010; Snyder 1977). Scholars disagree fundamentally about what strategic culture is and how it can be described. Some scholars contend that, even if one accepts the concept as intellectually justified, it is difficult to demonstrate that state behavior (the dependent variable) is causally influenced by strategic culture (the independent variable). Others note with concern that it is easy to overly essentialize the subject of inquiry and produce crude, if not racist or ethnocentric, caricatures (e.g., Larus 1979; Tanham 1992).

After robustly critiquing three generations of strategic culture theorists, Johnston (1995b) offers up a concept of strategic culture that has four key features. First, strategic culture must be observable and distinguishable from nonstrategic culture variables. Second, it must provide decision-makers with a "uniquely ordered set of strategic choices" (45) from which analysts can make predictions about state behavior. This set of ranked preferences must be consistent across the objects of analysis and even across time, and it may be nonresponsive to noncultural variables (e.g., threat level, organization, technology). Third, this strategic culture must be observed in strategic cultural objects (e.g., speeches, policy documents). Fourth, the transmission of this strategic culture must be traceable (46).

Johnston (1995b, 46) offers up a definition of strategic culture meeting these criteria that is derived from the work of Clifford Geertz (1973):

Strategic culture is an integrated "system of symbols" (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.

Johnston's (1995b) system of symbols has two components. The first is the basic assumptions that both the institution in question and its stakeholders hold concerning the strategic environment. Do they view war as inevitable or an aberration? How do they view the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses? How efficacious do they judge the use of force to be to eliminate threats, and under what conditions do they believe the use of force is most likely to prevail? These assumptions about the strategic environment provide important shared information among key stakeholders and reduce uncertainty about the strategic environment. Importantly, they emerge from "deeply historical sources, not from the current environment" (46).

The second component of this system of symbols is an operational understanding of means that are the most efficacious for managing threats, contingent on how the institution understands its strategic environment. Johnston (1995a) argues that, while it is very difficult to relate strategic culture to specific behavioral choices in part because the evidentiary requirements are quite onerous, scholars should at least be able to demonstrate how strategic culture limits the options available to the institution in question (37).

How can we apply this system of symbols to the Pakistan Army? For purposes of this study, I first assembled a collection of defense writings—a sample—that was as comprehensive and specifiable as possible. These strategic cultural objects are described later in this chapter. I began systematically working through this sample, which included thousands of articles and dozens of books authored by senior officers, to understand how the Pakistan Army understands its conflict with India and other competitors and adversaries, how it appreciates the nature of these foes, and how it appraises the efficacy of the application of force or other means to manage the threat environment it faces. Several consistent and enduring themes emerged from this effort. First, the army understands Pakistan to be an insecure state born from an inherently unfair Partition process in 1947. For Pakistan, the business of Partition is unfinished. Second, the army believes that it inherited most of the threat frontiers managed by the British Raj but only a fraction of its resources. Third, the army believes that India is implacably opposed to the very existence of Pakistan and seeks to subjugate if not outright annihilate the
state. This conviction was given further ballast by the 1971 war when India did in fact vivisect the young nation.

Fourth, the army is obsessed with various notions of strategic depth, whether geographical, territorial, or political. This concept of strategic depth has sometimes meant cultivating a physical space to place its military assets in the event of an Indian attack. Pakistan’s territory lacks depth. Its main lines of control run parallel to the Indian border, and at several points along the main Karachi-Peshawar road it comes within 60 miles of either the international border with India or the Line of Control in Kashmir (Rizvi 2002). A few natural barriers, such as rivers and mountains, separate the two adversaries in the strategic planes of the Punjab.

With the exception of the airfield in Quetta, there is no airfield farther than 150 miles from the Indian border. More often than this territorial concept, Pakistan has sought political strategic depth in Afghanistan. That is, the army has sought to cultivate a regime in Afghanistan that is favorably disposed toward Pakistan and that will deny India access to Afghanistan, from where it could harm Pakistan’s interests (Rizvi 2002).

Where possible, I also sought to identify the second component in Johnston’s (1995b) definition of strategic culture: namely, what are the more operational aspects of contending with this environment in light of how the army answers the previous questions? Distinguishing these elements is easier said than done. Nonetheless, I have identified several potential elements of this putative strategic culture and, most importantly, have traced the origins of the cultural and historical factors that shape the army’s evaluation of the world in which it lives as well as the means it has cultivated to best manage that world. One such means is Islam, variously used. The army has cultivated Islam to contend with internal and external threats alike. Because the army has arrogated to itself the defense of Pakistan’s ideology, which is essentially Islam, Pakistan’s perceptions of its internal and external threats are inherently intertwined. The Pakistan Army believes that India seeks not only to undo Pakistan’s territorial integrity but also to undermine the founding logic of the state and sow discord among Pakistan’s varied ethnic and sectarian groups. As detailed herein, the label “Islam” is constant even if the content of that label has changed over time.

An equally enduring part of Pakistan’s strategy to meet its security needs has been the cultivation of important partnerships with the United States, China, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Pakistan has also invested heavily first in conventional defense assets and, from the late 1960s, also in nuclear assets, facilitated by its varied partnerships. From 1947 onward, Pakistan has used nonstate actors to wage proxy warfare and campaigns of terrorism in India and Afghanistan variously under the guise of people’s war, guerrilla warfare, or jihad (which some Pakistani writers alternatively spell jehad). Over time, Pakistan’s military has masterfully used its nuclear deterrent to expand the scope of operations undertaken by nonstate actors on behalf of the state, confident that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will shield it from Indian or international retaliation.

The British handed down some of Pakistan’s beliefs about its strategic environment and the tools available to manage them: for example, its management of its border areas with Afghanistan; its appreciation of martial races; and instrumentalization of religious and ethnic difference. However, these beliefs have been consistently reinforced as a consequence of Pakistan’s efforts to apply those very tools. Other aspects of Pakistan’s perceptions of its environment and enemies are of more recent vintage and stem from the Pakistan movement or from the processes of Partition.

This study presents considerable evidence that the Pakistan Army, based on its accumulating body of history and experiences, will prefer to challenge the territorial status quo and India’s rise under virtually all circumstances. It will do so when possible in India, but when necessary it will do so by challenging India in the region—such as in Afghanistan. The tools that Pakistan has developed to do this include instrumentalizing religion at home and abroad, devising elaborate governance regimes within Pakistan to manage the western frontier, developing and supporting nonstate actors under its expanding nuclear umbrella, and forging rent-seeking relations with key external actors. Because the army defines defeat in terms of being unable to mount a challenge to India either territorially or politically, the army will prefer to take risks than to do nothing at all, which is synonymous with defeat.

Pakistan: An Army with a Country

Pakistanis and analysts of Pakistan have long remarked, with more truth than hyperbole, that while generally countries have armies, in Pakistan, the army has a country. This aphorism reflects the unfortunate history of Pakistan’s Westminster style of government at democratization. Brigadier (Retd.) Abdurrahman Siddiqi (1996, ii), detailing this phenomenon in his 1996 volume titled The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, observed the progressive subordination of Pakistan’s "national identity and interest" to the "growing power of the military image." By way of explanation, he suggests that because "there is no other institution to rival the military in organization and discipline, above all, in its control of the instruments of violence, its image...reaches a point of predominance and power" (ibid.). Consequently, "A sort of Prussianism is born to produce an army with a nation in place of a nation with an army" (ibid.). Because the Pakistan Army is the largest and dominant service, military dominated in fact means army dominated, even though Pakistan does have an air force and a navy as well as an array of paramilitary organizations.

Lt. Gen. Chihibi (1989, 65), who was a key general in the Zia coup of 1977 notes that successful "coup d'état" in Pakistan have always
been... led by the C-in-C Army or the COAS [Chief of Army Staff], and never a subordinate general or a junior officer... The Army generals would not do it, and it is beyond the capability of the Navy and the Airforce to do so.  

Pakistan's generals step in when they believe that the civilian order has failed disastrously and that their service to save the nation is required by virtue of their duty to the nation and because they believe that Pakistan's citizenry welcome the intervention. They are not entirely incorrect in their assessment that Pakistanis approve of the coup. Generally, Pakistanis have heaved sighs of relief when the generals oust the elected kleptocrats and install a technocracy, usually with the stated agenda of making Pakistan's system more suitable for democracy. Pakistan's encounters with military rule follow a similar pattern (International Crisis Group 1004, 2005, 2006a, 2007). The army chief seizes the government, suspends the constitution, issues a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), dismisses the parliament, and requires the Supreme Court to justify the coup under the principle of the doctrine of necessity (Wolf-Phillips 1979). The complicity of the Supreme Court is profoundly important. Justices who prefer to uphold their original oath to defend the constitution are simply replaced with justices who will acquiesce to the generals. Because the election commission draws from the superior judiciary, when elections are at last held they are conducted under the auspices of officials drawn from a highly compromised cadre of judges.

Perhaps reflecting the army's understanding of the democratic preferences of their citizenry, Pakistan's military leaders have all sought to govern with a patina of democracy, albeit under their control. Thus, within a few years of the coup the army chief, with the help of the intelligence agencies, cobbles together a "king's party," which draws from established mainstream political parties and new entrants seeking to take advantage of the military regime's patronage. In addition, the military uses its intelligence agencies to fashion an opposition of choice, usually composed of Islamist political parties. The Islamists become an important ally of the military government. Confident of an electable king's party and opposition of choice, the regime holds (inevitably flawed) elections that install the king's party in government. The ensuing pro-military parliament then enacts into law the various extraconstitutional orders issued by the army chief in his capacity as the president.

This is an interim move before the army regime collapses completely, partly due to the pressure from the military itself and partly due to the popular unrest and concomitant public distrust that develop toward the military government. The army retreats from formal power and permits a weak democratic restoration. In Pakistan, even though constitutionalism and democracy have never fully fructified, Pakistanis do not embrace military authoritarianism over long periods of time. The army is able to govern directly only for limited periods of time and only with the façade of democratic institutions. This is largely because the army fails to manage the state any better than the civilians it ousted and because army personnel themselves begin to resent the politicization of the force and missed promotions (and thus forced retirements) of senior generals arising from the army chief's refusal to leave his post. Eventually, the public demands a return to democracy—however imperfect or limited—and the army obliges in principle.

The army can be confident that democracy will remain under its thumb because Pakistan's military dictators have always left constitutional legacies that enable it to continue manipulating political affairs from the barracks. The army was hesitant to allow Benazir Bhutto to become prime minister after Zia's death. (Ms. Bhutto assumed leadership of the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] after Zia assassinated her father and founder of the party, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.) Nonetheless, the army was confident that it could keep her and her government in line due to a Zia-era constitutional measure: Article 58(2)(b) of the 1973 Constitution enacted with the Eighth Amendment. This provision allowed the president to dismiss the prime minister and the provincial chief ministers, dissolve the national and provincial assemblies, nominate judges to the superior judiciary, and appoint chiefs of the armed services. With the Eighth Amendment, Zia shifted the balance of power away from the position of the prime minister to that of the president. Throughout the 1990s, no parliament served out its term due to early dismissal by the president under 58(2)(b). This occurred with the connivance of the military (e.g., Bhutto's ouster in 1990 and Sharif's in 1993) and without (e.g., Bhutto's ouster in 1996 due to differences with President Farooq Leghari, also a member of the Ms. Bhutto's PPP). No civilian government could muster the two-thirds majority to repeal this amendment until 1997, when Sharif returned to power and jettisoned the odious 58(2)(b). Pakistan again returned to a parliamentary form of democracy, but the interregnum was brief: Musharraf restored 58(2)(b) when he seized the government in October 1999. It remained in place until the Eighteenth Amendment was passed in April 2010, which again returned Pakistan to a parliamentary democracy (Hoffman 2011; Jaffrelot 2002a; Shah 2003).

This antagonistic relationship between the military and the democratic parties is more reciprocal than may seem at first blush. When opposition political leaders request help with weakening their opponents, the military often obliges (Siddiqua 2007). As a consequence of this elaborate collusion between the military, politicians, judiciary, and bureaucracy, the first quasi-civilian government to serve out its entire five-year term since 1977 was elected under the auspices of Musharraf in October 2002. It should be noted that Musharraf had every incentive to keep this parliament in place as long as it more or less served his purposes. In June 2004, Musharraf dismissed Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who came into office following the October 2002 elections conducted under Musharraf's government. Musharraf replaced him with Shaukat Aziz, the American Citibank executive, who remained in that capacity until November 2007. In March 2013 when the previous PPP-led government stepped down to give way to a caretaker
government and fresh elections in May, it was the first wholly civilian government to serve out its term and be replaced by a constitutionally elected new government.

It is a curious fact that, despite the generally democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people, the army has dominated the state since the early years of independence. Given the army’s ability to bring down a civilian government through direct or indirect intervention, few politicians are willing to take on the army. Most prefer to defer to the military in exchange for the opportunity to remain in power (Haqqani 2005; Siddiqi 2007). Not only has the Pakistan Army directly and indirectly manipulated the domestic and foreign affairs of the state, but it also has had a preeminent role in shaping Pakistan’s educational curricula, textbooks, and the publicly and privately owned media (Faiz 2011; Farooq 2012a, 2012b; Haqqani 2005; Kohari 2012; Sabri 2012; Yusuf 2011). Thus, the Pakistan Army is able to cultivate support for its strategic imperatives across a wide swath of Pakistan’s diverse public.

Given the army’s power to set Pakistan’s foreign policy, as well as any domestic policy in which it is interested, it is reasonable to simplify Pakistan’s strategic culture to that of the army. While some studies of strategic culture focus on the civilian decision-making institutions that shape a country’s defense policy (Johnston 1995a, 1995b; Kier 1995; Snyder 1977), this effort focuses narrowly on the army. Critics may argue that this approach is overly reductionist and may counter that there have indeed been important periods in Pakistan’s history when civilians took the initiative. One example of this is the democratically elected but highly autocratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who served as prime minister from 1973 to 1977 and as president and chief martial law administrator between 1971 and 1973. Bhutto was able to take advantage of the army’s weakened position due to the national belief that it was responsible for the loss of East Pakistan. However, by 1978 the army was back in power (Siddiqi 2007). Another example is that of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, appointed by Zia following the 1985 elections, which were held on a non-party basis. Zia’s amendments to Pakistan’s constitution had weakened the prime minister’s powers, bolstering his confidence that Junejo would be an easily controlled puppet. But Junejo infuriated Zia by demanding the end of martial law, refusing to let the parliament rubber-stamp Zia’s various ordinances, and signing the Geneva Accords in April 1988, thus ending the conflict in Afghanistan without specifying who would govern Afghanistan after the Soviet departure. After having received the last tranche of assistance from the United States, in May 1988 Zia dissolved the parliament and dismissed Junejo (Haqqani 2005).

But notwithstanding these examples, the army has still dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011). Moreover, with the return of democracy following Zia’s death in 1988 and Benazir Bhutto’s election that same year, every prime minister has governed with the explicit understanding that the civilian government will not interfere in military or foreign policy. Prime ministers who reneged on this commitment have quickly found their governments dismissed (Khan 2012a; Shah 2004). Taken together, these facts justify speaking of Pakistan’s strategic culture as identical with that of the army, at least to a first-order approximation.

Reproducing Culture: Recruitment in the Pakistan Army

Pakistan’s army is an all-volunteer force, with far more applicants for officer and other ranks than there are positions to fill. Like most militaries, “while [it is] composed of many, ever-changing individuals,” the Pakistan Army has “distinct and enduring personalities of [its] own that govern much of [its] behavior” (Builder 1989, 3). Even though militaries are composed of individuals, one of their goals is to shape the behavior, comportment, and beliefs of the men (and in some cases women) in uniform. Like all militaries, the Pakistan Army does this by imposing recruitment standards, mandating consistent and regularized training at the country’s military institutions for various levels of promotion and specialization, and constantly asserting selection pressure as enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers come up for promotion. Krebs (2006), describing this general socialization process, explains that militaries may “socialize the rank and file and officers to national norms reflected in the military’s manpower policy. Because the military is (often presumed to be) a ‘total institution’ and because soldiers generally serve during their ‘impressionable years,’ inductees may be nearly blank slates on which the military can inscribe values” (6). The Pakistan Army, like most modern armies, must bring together individuals of various backgrounds in common cause and in a collaborative spirit, providing a setting seemingly well-suited to breaking down dividing lines based on race, ethnicity, religion or class” (7). As described throughout this volume (especially Chapter 4), the army sees itself as a site of nation formation, with soldiers and officers alike entering as Punjabi, Sindhi, Pakhtun, or Baloch but becoming Pakistani.

Generally, enlisted personnel (also called jawans in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, which translates as “young men”) must have at least a tenth-grade education, be between 17 and 23 years of age, and meet a number of physical requirements. However, the army relaxes its educational and even physical standards in places where it hopes to expand recruitment. For example, in Balochistan, recruits with an eighth-grade education will be considered for all positions except as technicians, nurses, or military police. Recruits from Balochistan can be somewhat shorter as well, with a minimum height of 5 feet, 4 inches instead of 5 feet, 6 inches, among other relaxations of physical standards (Pakistan Army n.d.). While there are no recent, publicly available data for the recruitment of the enlisted ranks (jawans), Cohen (1984) found that they tended to come from
throughout Pakistan but from remote districts with rural peasant backgrounds. These recruits are brought together at regimental training centers, which are the core of the army's training system. Some of these soldiers may be unaccustomed to bathrooms or latrines, fixed meals, or regular working hours. If necessary, before training commences recruits learn Urdu and receive supplementary primary education. All recruits learn a stylized version of Pakistan's history, and they are encouraged to "take pride in the fact that they are Muslims and part of a broader world community" (38; see also Schofield 2011).

Enlisted personnel train at a regimental center for 36 weeks, which is often a self-contained community, with its own schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, and housing. Jawans remain with their original regiment for much of their military career (typically eighteen years). Like most militaries, the Pakistan Army affords enlisted personnel numerous educational opportunities throughout their time in the service, and some enlisted men will eventually become noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or junior commissioned officers (JCOs). The latter serve as an important link between the enlisted personnel and the officers, who are often better educated and of higher socioeconomic status and who are increasingly likely to have urban roots (Fair 2012).

In contrast to the various regimental centers that serve to train jawans, the principal institution for training officers is the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, in the town of Abbottabad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province—made famous when bin Laden was discovered in a safe house a short distance from the PMA. Admission to the PMA is very competitive. The Pakistan Army does not release public information about the number of applicants it receives, and scholarly estimates vary. Fair and Nawaz (2011) report that each year some 3,000 candidates apply for about 320 cadet places in each of two regular long courses at the PMA. Schofield (2011), however, claims that between 45,000 and 50,000 apply each year, of which the PMA accepts only 1,000. Per her interview data, the PMA admits roughly 400 cadets for each of the two long courses, which begin in spring and fall. A few hundred others enter the PMA's one-year Technical Graduate Course as well as a six-month course that trains officers for the medical corps, education corps, judge advocate generals, and veterinarians, among other specialized fields. Personal biographical accounts of officers coming from the PMA (or, prior to Partition, Sandhurst or the Indian Military Academy) stress that they were called gentleman cadets, which emphasizes that the entire program at the PMA stresses character development and the production of well-rounded, polished officers (ibid.).

The criteria for officer candidates are not particularly onerous. Aspirants must be single, hold at least an intermediate degree (i.e., 12 years of schooling), and be between 17 and 22 years of age. They must also obtain a score of at least 50 percent in their matriculation (tenth grade) or Fine Arts (FA), which one receives upon successfully completing twelfth grade exams (Pakistan Army n.d.). Applicants undergo initial testing and screening at eight regional selection and recruitment centers across the country, located at Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Multan (in the province of the Punjab); Hyderabad and Karachi (in the province of Sindh); Quetta (in the province of Balochistan); Peshawar (in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province); and Gilgit (in the administrative area of Gilgit-Baltistan, previously known, with Pakistani Kashmir, as the Northern Areas). Those who meet the basic criteria next take an intelligence exam on which they must score at least 50 percent. (At various times, the Pakistan Army has relaxed standards for applicants from Sindh and Balochistan, provinces in which the army has had difficulty recruiting and in which educational standards are low.) If they score satisfactorily on the written exam, candidates undergo physical and medical tests and a preliminary interview at the recruitment centers (Pakistan Army n.d.).

Successful candidates continue on to screening at the Inter-Services/General Headquarters Selection and Review Board in Kohat or at satellite centers in Gujranwala (Punjab), Malir (Sindh), or Quetta (Balochistan). The screening process is arduous and includes four days of observation and testing to assess recruits' intelligence, psychological profile, leadership potential, and physical fitness. Successful candidates are then recommended for the PMA. Each year, Army General Headquarters determine the precise number of slots for the PMA using regimental reports of shortfalls. Officer selection is generally based on merit, with the exception of episodic efforts to enhance the prospects of cadets from provinces such as Sindh and Balochistan, which are considerably underrepresented in the officer corps (Fair and Nawaz 2011; Pakistan Army n.d.).

Gentlemen cadets come from all over the country as well as from every socioeconomic class. (Analysts of the Pakistan Army speculate, in the absence of hard evidence, that PMA cadets no longer come primarily from the upper middle class, as was once the case.) Some recruits may speak English well, while others have little English proficiency. The PMA aims to "bring them all up to the same cultural level" (Schofield 2011, 77). Apart from learning how to salute and march, PMA recruits—like their enlisted counterparts—are taught how to use a flush toilet, sit on the commode, care for their uniforms, perform physical exercise, and even use the proper dining etiquette (ibid.). After graduating from the two-year program, cadets are commissioned with the rank of second lieutenant (Fair and Nawaz 2011). Notably, the current recruitment procedures do not appear to differ markedly from those in the past, according to the 1976 account of Lt. Gen. Attiqur Rahman, a noted army historian who served as the military law administrator of West Pakistan during Gen. Yahya Khan's military regime.16

The Pakistan Army, like other militaries, uses its selection process and criteria, its various educational and training institutions and opportunities, and regular evaluation for promotion to ensure cohesion and adherence to standards across the ranks of the force. South Asian Foreign Area Officers in the US Army as well
as scholars of the Pakistan Army also note that in the Pakistan Army officers are also "judged on their personal behavior to a degree that is uncommon" in western armies. Penetration by the military's values is likely to deepen as the period of service lengthens, in part because a soldier's professional trajectory depends on the military command's assessments of his performance. The Pakistan Army fosters an institutional body of knowledge by commissioning studies at the Command and Staff College, the National Defense University (previously National Defense College), and other training centers and through a massive body of military publications published either by the General Headquarters or through Inter-Services Public Relations, a military organization headed by a major general.

Methods and Sources of This Study

To illuminate the lineaments of the Pakistan Army’s ostensible strategic culture, I explore six decades of the Pakistan Army’s security discourse, through which the army articulates external dangers and "carve[s] out and maintain[s] a particular version of national identity for the state" (Nizamani 2000, 11). A fundamental assumption of this project is that these writings comprise an evolving discourse rather than a collection of prescriptions, descriptions, and assessments offered by disconnected authors at particular times. These essays reflect "expressions of particular interests and justifiers of a distinct regime of practices or truth" (ibid.). In this work, I use Nizamani’s concept of discourse analysis, which he employed to understand the elite rhetoric surrounding nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. Nizamani’s notion of discourse draws on Foucault’s earlier contention that “each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (12). In Pakistan, as I have already discussed and will continue to demonstrate throughout this volume, the army has a privileged place in defining truth, determining how truth is described, and regulating who gets to articulate it. For most of Pakistan’s existence as an independent state, the Pakistan Army has exercised its power to produce truth from its privileged position as the supreme manager of the state’s affairs.

One of the ways the army has produced truth has been by exercising control over knowledge and information and developing, nurturing, and policing epistemic communities. Nizamani (2000), to explain the elite consensus in Pakistan and India on their nuclear weapons program, adopts this concept of epistemic communities from the work of Peter M. Haas (1992) and describes them as essentially networks of persons who are granted expertise on particular issues and who share fundamental worldviews or epistemes. As Haas notes, whereas some scholars associate “epistemic communities” with “scientific communities” in particular, in his formulation, they “need not be made up of scientists or of professionals applying the same methodology” (3). His conceptualization of epistemic community resembles Flick’s (1979) “thought collective” or a “sociological group with a common style of thinking” (3). Haas describes a number of other characteristics of epistemic communities: they share ways of knowing and patterns of reasoning and espouse a common “policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared knowledge” (ibid.). Nizamani expands this concept of epistemic communities to include public intellectuals, media personalities, and retired and serving military and civilian personnel, who advance state preferences for nuclear weapons and build consensus for them among the citizens of the states of India and Pakistan.

With respect to the Pakistan Army, I argue that these epistemic communities are linked to the army through the creative activities of both active and retired military personnel who author personal memoirs, accounts of wars, treatises on Pakistan’s history and policies, and essays for military journals or commercial publications such as Pakistan Defense Journal that are aimed at the military community. Many of these military-based commentators become public intellectuals and prominent voices in Pakistan’s print, radio, and television media that help to shape Pakistani public opinion on a range of issues. When military officers retire, they are frequently granted senior leadership posts within private-sector enterprises but also government ministries. For example, during Musharraf’s tenure, Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi, who headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) between 1993 and 1995, served as Musharraf’s communications minister (2000–2002) and then as education minister (2004–2007). When the country is under an army dispensation, the army dispatches numerous officers to run governmental offices. In 2008, when Gen. Ashfaq Kayani became the army chief, he ordered that army officers would be withdrawn from some 23 civil departments including the Ministry of Education, the Water and Power Development Authority, the National Accountability Bureau, and the National Highway Authority. This order did not affect retired officers who were so ensconced (Masood 2008). Retired and serving officers are also able to exert influence outside of Pakistan by participating in seminars throughout the world, sojourning at prominent think tanks and universities, and authoring books (recent examples include Khan 2012a, 2012b; Matinuddin 2009; Salik 2009; Walker 2006).

The military cultivates civilians including scholars, journalists, and analysts, providing them selective access to the institution and punishing them—either with physical harm (or the threat of it) to the author or her family members or simply with the denial of future access—should they produce knowledge that harms the interests of the army. Since access is perhaps the most valuable currency among those who wish to be and remain experts on the military, the army
uses this implied transaction to produce sympathetic assessments of the armed forces and their actions and goals. While it is easy to focus on the coercive ability of the army to shape and influence these epistemic communities, it should be noted that individuals who become part of them have agency and have personal and professional reasons to join them through either active consideration or passive acquiescence. However, remaining outside the circle of favored commentators itself imposes constraints on the ability to garner accurate and recent insights into the institution.

Pakistani media coverage of the military should also be read within the context of the army’s management of knowledge about the institution and its role in managing security and domestic affairs of the state. While in recent years many commentators have praised Pakistan’s press for its relative freedom, self-censorship is still very common, as is deference to the army’s preferred narratives. The intelligence agencies’ willingness to use lethal methods against intrinsignist journalists and other domestic critics has repeatedly earned Pakistan the dubious distinction of being one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011).

As Shuja Nawaz (2008a) explains, Pakistan’s media was a willing participant in incorrect reporting on each of Pakistan’s wars with India. Pakistan’s media reassured Pakistanis that their military was succeeding up until the moment that the various ceasefires, and their terms, could no longer be concealed. Pakistan’s media also depicted India as the aggressor, even when Pakistani actions clearly and directly precipitated the war. As I will show, Pakistan’s defense journals also offer histories of these conflicts that are at odds with scholarly accounts of the same. Pakistani textbooks repeat the same highly stylized narratives (Sabri 2012).

Pakistan presents an example of how more than six decades of ossified historical inaccuracies and distortion can resist the sanitizing effect of the global information technology revolution and the resulting expansion of access to abundant—if, alas, low-quality—information. The endurance of these inaccurate accounts of Pakistan’s history can be partly attributed to the prevalence of conspiracy theories as a means of framing and understanding events as well as Pakistan’s relationships to those events. Weinbaum (1996) notes the reliance on conspiracy narratives in Pakistan and the resulting suspicions, which are “readily sustained in the absence of full, creditable information. [Conspiracy theories] offer disarmingly simple and not entirely implausible explanations, and no amount of evidence can refute them.... [The] more the evidence seems to disprove the theory, the deeper the conspiracy is conceived to be” (Weinbaum 1996, 649). A full exposition of the role of conspiracy theories in Pakistan is beyond the scope of this volume, but numerous scholars have explored this phenomenon, in Pakistan and elsewhere (see, e.g., Jamil 2011; Wood et al. 2012; Yusuf 2011).

In this volume I rely heavily on the Pakistan Army’s professional publications, particularly those published either by the army’s general headquarters or Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), which serves as the official publication clearinghouse for the armed forces. These official publications include Pakistan Army Journal, Citadel (the official publication of the Command and Staff College in Quetta), Hilal (an official ISPR publication), Margalla Papers (a key publication of the National Defence University and previously of the National Defence College), Pakistan Defense Review, Defence Journal (before it became a private entity), and Pakistan Army Green Book. Throughout this volume, I offer specific quotations from this literature either because the quote is exemplary of a particular genre of accounts or understanding of an event or concept or because the author of the quote in question has inordinate importance to the institution. For example, if the current army chief offers insights that are novel, I do not discount them because they do not echo views espoused earlier by other officers. If a particular view offered by a specific quote is not representative of the varied writings studied in this research, I note it as an exceptional offering. Thus, unless noted elsewhere, the specific pieces I cite here are representative of writings that dilate on particular themes I discuss or represent the views of seniormost leadership.

At times the essays in these volumes may strike the reader as being outright noncredible, such as India’s posted commitment to destroying Pakistan, America’s conniving to subjugate Pakistan, and even racist and xenophobic stereotypes perpetuated in their pages. However, it is important to note that these claims—however bizarre—are consistent across times, appear in numerous publications officially sanctioned by the army, and often, as in the case of the Green Books, are prefaced by the army chief himself. Thus, it would be imprudent to dismiss these writings. While these writings do not comprise doctrine per se, they represent an important body of literature in which the army presents to itself the way it understands the world in which it operates. (Unlike the US military, the Pakistan Army does not make public its various doctrinal documents.)

In addition to these official military publications, I also examine the memoirs of Pakistan’s senior military leadership, the most recent being that of former Chief Pervez Musharraf. It should be noted that these memoirs are not always published with authorization from the army headquarters or ISPR. In some cases, the military officers have published their accounts to clear their name or to dissociate themselves from policies they found objectionable. In other cases, the officers believe that their life journey offers insights and lessons for Pakistanis generally. Even if these officers’ memoirs are not always blessed by the military as an institution, they provide important insights into the military’s strategic culture. I would be remiss if I did not mention that military history as a scholarly genre is virtually absent in Pakistan, despite its numerous conflicts in its relatively short existence. Even when officers discuss the varied wars in their autobiographies, their accounts read as personal essays about what they did and thought during the war in their private capacities as well as in their standing as men in uniform. These narratives rarely comprise critical historical accounts of the conflicts in question.
Matinuddin (1994) offers one reason for this lacuna of Pakistani military history. Speaking specifically about the 1971 war, he notes that there is little interest in writing about defeat. When a fellow officer suggested that he write about this war, Matinuddin at first demurred. He had little interest in exposing an ignominious defeat particularly because doing so would mean "treading on the toes" of senior colleagues with whom he developed personal friendships after retirement (17).

I complement this documentary evidence with observations that I have made over more than 15 years of fieldwork in Pakistan, during which I have focused on civil–military affairs and related issues. However, unlike the aforementioned documents, interview subjects actively use interactions with foreigners to shape perceptions about the Pakistan Army and its objectives, needs, actions, and threat perceptions. Military personnel who are authorized to interact with foreigners generally know their briefs very well and do not deviate from script, which casts further aspersions on interview-derived data (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011). In contrast, military publications and officer memoirs reflect an evolving conversation within the institution and the epistemic community in which it is embedded and that it helps nurture. Because the professional defense publications are not intended for a readership beyond Pakistan’s men—and occasionally women—in uniform, they offer the most accurate reflection of how the institution wants observers, both in and out of uniform, to view Pakistan’s domestic and foreign affairs rather than an orchestrated effort to shape international perceptions. They reflect and perpetuate the culture and preferences of the army over time. These documents offer a pristine glimpse, untainted by a desire to influence external audiences, into how the army understands its strategic environment and what options are best to manage it.

These Pakistani professional military journals differ from US military publications in three important ways. First, during periods of war, US military journals devote significant space to topical discussions of contemporary battles, war-fighting strategies, and subjects that are salient to the conflict at hand (e.g., logistics, recruitment, coalition building, personnel). In contrast, Pakistan’s journals are notable for the absence of such discussions. For example, even though Pakistan was embroiled in the so-called Afghan jihad throughout the decade of the 1980s, the journals are surprisingly silent on this conflict (with a few exceptions, discussed herein). Equally notable is the fact that many of the Pakistan Army journals have not discussed Pakistan’s post-2001 operations in the tribal areas. This is peculiar because Pakistan has launched numerous campaigns in the tribal areas and even in settled areas such as Swat (Jones and Fair 2010a; Nawaz 2011; Tellis 2008). This reflects more generally what Schaffer and Schaffer (2011) note as a general institutional avoidance of self-criticism or efforts to derive lessons learned from past efforts.

Second, when these journals do publish accounts of particular battles in wars, they are written as memoirs rather than as critical analyses. These essays tend to focus on the personal relationships that the author formed or the particular emotional experiences that the author underwent during the conflict. More often than not, these memoirs focus on battles in which Pakistan prevailed but within wars that Pakistan lost. This is most true of the 1971 war. Third, there is a persistent emphasis on religious themes, such as the nature of the Islamic warrior, the role of Islam in training, the importance of Islamic ideology for the army, and the salience of jihad. Pakistan’s military journals frequently take as their subjects famous Quranic battles, such as the Battle of Badr. Ironically, the varied Quranic battles are discussed in more analytical detail in Pakistan’s journals than are Pakistan’s own wars with India. A comparable focus on religion in the Indian army (which shares a common heritage with the Pakistan Army) would be quite scandalous. It is difficult to fathom that any Indian military journal would present an appraisal of the Kurukshetra War, which features the Hindu god Vishnu and is described in the Hindu Vedic epic poem the Mahabharata. Judging by the frequency with which articles on such topics appear in Pakistan’s professional publications, religion is clearly acceptable, and perhaps desirable, as a subject of discussion.