States, scientists and the Bomb: The cases of Iraq and Libya

Abstract: Despite similar starting points, Iraq and Libya’s nuclear weapons program turned out very different. Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was interrupted on the cusp of success in early 1991, while Libya’s program was barely operational when it was dismantled in late 2003. Why?

To answer this question I explore both programs from the perspectives of scientists and decision-makers in each country. I bring new evidence to light from archives in several countries, the private papers of key participants, and interviews with scientists and decision-makers. This evidence shows that both programs drifted from their mission, both regimes attempted to get their project back on track, but only Iraq succeeded. One of the main reasons, I argue, is that the Iraqi state was better equipped to intervene in the nuclear weapons program. 

About the Speaker: Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer is a junior faculty fellow at CISAC. She joined CISAC as a visiting associate professor and Stanton nuclear security junior faculty fellow in September 2012. Between 2008 and 2010 she was a predoctoral and postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Braut-Hegghammer is an assistant professor and head of the Nuclear Studies Program at Norwegian Defense University College. She received her PhD, entitled “Nuclear Entrepreneurs: Drivers of Nuclear Proliferation” from the London School of Economics in 2010. She received the British International Studies Association’s Michael Nicholson Thesis Prize that same year for her work.